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The Origin of the Appeal in America
by
MARY SARAH BILDER
"Whenever yet was your appeal denied?"1
-William Shakespeare
Introduction
The word "appeal" haunts American legal culture. We refer to a
higher court review of a lower court or administrative agency decision as
an "appeal." We call these higher reviewing courts "Courts of Appeal."
And we describe our vertical, multi-tiered legal system in which a Su-
preme Court is the final arbiter of judgment as an "appellate" system.
Reviewing courts ask counsel, "Why are you appealing?" Law school
professors ask students, "What was the theory of appeal?" And lawyers
ask themselves, "Can I appeal?"'
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1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF HENRY THE FOURTH act 4, sc. 1.
2. See generally FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING
(1994). For the sociological approach to the modem idea of appeal, see Burton Atkins, Inter-
ventions and Power in Judicial Hierarchies: Appellate Courts in England and the United States,
24 L. & Soc'Y REv. 71 (1990); Martin Shapiro, Appeal, 14 L. & SOc'Y REV. 629 (1980).
Justice Jackson once mocked our description of the appellate system in his famous comment,
[913]
But how did the word and concept of "appeal" ever get into Ameri-
can legal culture and discourse? Almost every legal system develops
procedures to address grievances about initial judicial determinations.
However, as familiar as the word "appeal" is to us today, the appeal was
a surprising procedure for the American colonists to have adopted.
Three hundred years ago, the term "appeal" referred to a legal procedure
which was available only in the separate system of English courts gov-
erned by canon and civil law-and not in the common law system with
which the Puritan settlers were so enamored. The legal procedure known
as "the appeal" did not refer to what we now think of as an "appeal"-
the correction by a higher court of errors of law made by a lower court.
Instead, the "appeal" referred to a procedure under which a higher tribu-
nal could completely and broadly rehear and redecide not only the law,
but also the entire facts of a case. Moreover, the legal procedure called
"the appeal" represented a substantive theory of justice, emphasizing the
importance of equity and a particular attitude towards the hierarchy of
authority. It was this more liberal system of redress that eight of the
colonies initially adopted, including Massachusetts and Rhode Island.3
Indeed, the New England colonists adopted the appeal despite its an-
noying repercussions. In Rhode Island, men like William Harris used
this concept of the appeal to travel many times to England to plead before
the English Privy Council.4 In Massachusetts, Governor John Winthrop
worked to discourage men like religious dissenter John Wheelwright from
appealing to England.5 And remonstrant Robert Child's efforts to appeal
drove Edward Winslow to pen a condemnatory pamphlet, New-Englands
Salamander Discovered.6 In fact, "salamander"-a mythical lizard that
endured fire without harm-was the epithet used across the colonies for
these appellants. The great intellectual and oft-governor of Rhode Island,
Roger Williams, wrote of Harris in 1667: "He is like the Salamander
"We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
3. 1 JULIUS GOEBEL JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 119-26 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise His-
tory of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1971) [hereinafter GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT].
4. Harris Papers, in 10 COLLECTIONS OF THE RHODE ISLAND HISTORICAL SOCiETY 25,
25-42 (1902) (noting that Harris traveled in 1664, 1678, and 1679) [hereinafter Harris Papers].
5. See infra text accompanying notes 235-244.
6. EDWARD WINSLOW, NEW-ENGLANDS SALAMANDER DISCOVERED (1647), reprinted
in 2 COLLECTIONS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIErY 110-45 (3d series 1830).
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always delighting to live in the fire of contention." 7 This antipathy for
salamanders is not surprising; Williams, like many early colonists, be-
lieved that the "peace makers" were "Sons of God."8 Yet Williams, like
many others, helped to found and defend a legal system that, through the
device of the appeal, would produce countless of such litigating "sala-
manders"-perhaps understanding that these salamanders were actually
the signs of an accepted system of equitable justice.
Over time, many of these American colonies would replace or com-
bine the appeal with the more traditional review procedures of the com-
mon law: the writ of error and the writ of certiorari.9 And by the eight-
eenth and nineteenth centuries, these more common-law-like procedures
had significantly narrowed the possibilities of review-for example,
courts only permitted redress for errors of law shown in the written rec-
ord of the case, similar to procedures in England.10 Yet the word "ap-
peal" and arguably some of its broader jurisprudential connotations never
completely vanished from the American legal system.
The appeal and the writ of error thus were two separate paths, and
although our modem appellate system seems to owe more today to the
narrow theory of redress represented by the writ of error, the fact that we
stubbornly continue to use the word "appeal" suggests that some part of
the original substantive theory of the appeal remains with us. In a legal
world often obsessed with a static view of the rule of law, with a me-
chanical distinction between law and facts, and with one-bite-at-the-apple
theories of review, perhaps the word still survives because we still re-
member, perhaps still continue to believe in, this early, broader and more
flexible and equitable notion of appeal.
Most scholars of early American law have avoided the possibility
that the appeal, as it entered early American colonial law, was initially
7. Harris Papers, supra note 4, at 78. Harris was not the only appealing salamander.
John Winthrop similarly referred to William Vassall as a salamander, "a man never at rest, but
when he was in the fire of contention." 1 CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD OF
AMERICAN HISTORY: THE SETTLEMENTS 492 n.2 (1934).
8. Letter from Roger Williams to John Winthrop, Jr. (ca. Jan 1648/49), in 5 WINTHROP
PAPERS 297, 298 (Mass. Historical Society 1947); see also THEODORE DWIGHT BOZEMAN, To
LIVE ANCIENT LIVES: THE PRIMITIVIST DIMENSION IN PURITANISM (1988).
9. See 1 GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 19-25. See gener-
ally ROBERT J. MARTINEAU, APPELLATE JUSTICE IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 23 (1990); PETER CHARLES HOFFER, LAW AND PEOPLE IN
COLONIAL AMERICA 35-36 (1992).
10. ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 72-73, 80-81 (1941)
[hereinafter POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE].
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used to mean the type of broad rehearing available in the ecclesiastical
system. The conventional story of the origins of the appeal in America
remains that advanced by Columbia Law School Professor Julius Goebel
and Harvard Law School Professor Roscoe Pound.11 Both men explained
the broad scope of review exercised by certain early colonial courts and
the presence of the word "appeal" by locating the appeal within two pre-
existing stories of common law development. In an influential set of
books on the origins of the appellate system written in the 1940s, Roscoe
Pound claimed that the presence of the appeal resulted from "confusion
and a laxity or liberality, as one may choose to call it" 2 about English
common law legal procedures. 3 Influenced by the "frontier thesis," he
11. Two other bodies of scholarship implicate the appeal. One area has focused on the
functional notion of a supreme court. Barbara Aronstein Black's work typifies this approach.
Her work argues that the "concept of a supreme court" arose prior to the 1660s in the Massa-
chusetts judicial system. See Barbara Aronstein Black, The Concept of a Supreme Court: Mas-
sachusetts Bay, 1630-1686, in THE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME
JUDICIAL COURT: 1692-1992 at 43, 43-79 (Russell K. Osgood ed., 1992) [hereinafter Black,
The Concept of a Supreme Court]; Barbara Aronstein Black, Massachusetts and the Judges:
Judicial Independence in Perspective, 3 L. & HIST. 101-61 (1985) [hereinafter Black, Massa-
chusetts and the Judges]; Barbara Aronstein Black, The Judicial Power and the General Court
in Early Massachusetts (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with
the author) [hereinafter Black, The Judicial Power]. Black's insight is that, prior to the mo-
ment when the supreme court is labeled a "supreme court," one can find in existence some of
the underlying elements of the concept of a court. Her argument, however, struggles with sepa-
ration of powers theory and the problem of describing a court except through the institutional
lens. For example, Russell Osgood argues that the "institutional breach" that arose from the
Lords of Trades' efforts to centralize colonial control "preclude[s] any strong claim to an insti-
tutional existence" prior to 1692. Russell K. Osgood, The Supreme Judicial Court, 1692-1992:
An Overview, in THE HISTORY OF THE LAW IN MASSACHUSETTS: THE SUPREME JUDICIAL
COURT: 1692-1992, supra, at 10.
The other area has focused on carefully articulating the development of review proce-
dures that became the foundations of administrative law. Edith Henderson's work is most no-
table within this area. Henderson argued that certiorari and mandamus developed in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries in response to the desire of aggrieved citizens for new remedies.
See EDITH G. HENDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CERTIORARI
AND MANDAMUS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 1-3 (1963). But Henderson's ultimate inter-
est, like Black's, was in the development of the idea of judicial review. See id. at 1-143. And
like Black, Pound, and Goebel, Henderson perceived the gradual development of limited nature
of judicial review as a good idea. See id. at 3. On the relationship between these administra-
tive remedies and judicial review in England, see PETER CANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 8-11, 61-72 (2d ed. 1992); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, LIONS OVER THE
THRONE: THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION IN ENGLISH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 4-6, 122-43 (1987)
12. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE, supra note 10, at 81.
13. In the early 1940s, Pound advanced his theory of the appeal in two books. See
POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS (1940) [hereinafter POUND, ORGANIZATION]; and
POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE, supra note 10.
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saw the appeal in the colonies as part of a "simple system" that was natu-
ral to the "circumstances of pioneer communities." 14  In 1971, in the
popular first volume of the Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court,
Goebel argued that the "so-called appeal" was the result of colonial ad-
aptation of English justice-of-the-peace practice."5 Still in the grasp of his
local practices theory of legal transmission, Goebel proclaimed that "or-
dinary men" from "the backwaters of the mainstream of common law"
brought this justice-of-the-peace practice to the colonies.
1 6
Why were such eminent scholars as Professors Goebel and Pound so
quick to find the appeal's origin in the common law? Perhaps because
like many twentieth century legal academics, both men believed that the
14. POUND, ORGANIZATION, supra note 13, at 57.
15. 1 GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 19. Goebel claimed
that the appeal was an "adaptation to new uses of a procedure in the English Quarter Sessions
Courts." Id. He stated that the "name of 'appeal' was popularly attached to this procedure at
an early date, and given currency by the manuals composed for the use of justices of the
peace." Id. at 24. This Sessions procedure involved a group of justices of the peace reviewing
the decision of a justice of the peace. See id. at 25.
For Julius Goebel's theory that the transmission of legal ideas occurred through legal
practices, see Julius Goebel, Jr., King's Law and Local Custom in Seventeenth Century New
England, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 416 (1931). The application of this approach to the appeal actu-
ally predated Goebel's 1931 article. In 1894, Harold Hazeltine began his institutional history of
appeals to the king in council by suggesting that "the practice of appealing from colonial courts
to that tribunal as a court of last resort... taught the colonists to look more and more to a su-
preme tribunal for the adjudication of their legal cases, and to accept as law the judicial opin-
ions of that body." Harold D. Hazeltine, Appeals from Colonial Courts to the King in Council,
with Especial Reference to Rhode Island, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN HISTORICAL
ASSOCIATION 299 (1894). Hazeltine, however, did not expand on the idea of a legal "practice"
and his account merely described cases and statutes. See id.
In the writing of Goebel and his student and colleague, Joseph Smith, the legal practices
approach was applied to explain the history of the appeal. Smith first sought to apply the legal
practices approach to the study of the "Privy Council of England as a judicial body." Smith's
subtle-perhaps even oblique-discussion focused on establishing that the colonial appeals to the
Privy Council were based on an analogy to medieval appeals to the King in Council from the
Channel Islands. Although Smith never clearly explained the significance of the Channel Island
precedent, he appeared to be arguing that the colonies were governed by a "fragment of royal
authority" intended for an entirely different situation. JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE
PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN PLANTATIONS 5 (1950) [hereinafter SMITH, APPEALS];
see also Joseph H. Smith, Administrative Control of the Courts of the American Plantations, 61
COLUM. L. REV. 1210 (1961). The book supported the Hazeltine thesis, implying that it was
this practice of appealing to the Privy Council that had created in the Americans the concept of
a judicial hierarchy. SMITH, APPEALS, supra, at 5-42, 96-99. Yet in 1971 when Goebel pub-
lished his massive, influential story of the development of appellate courts for the Holmes De-
vise History of the Supreme Court, he was unwilling to accept that the origin of the American
practice of appeal, particularly within the colonies, lay in the remnants of medieval royal con-
ciliar practice. See 1 GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 19-25.
16. 1 GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 1, 5.
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American judicial system had developed in a progressively enlightened
fashion from a common-law core idea of the importance of rule of law.
Pound explicitly stated that the purpose of his history was to "make a
proper judicial review in proper cases an available remedy." 17 He sought
to distinguish "what is behind the abuses we must eliminate, what princi-
ples are sound, as shown by experience, and what are but remnants of
ideas which came from English procedure." I" He wanted to abolish any
"accompanying crudities and confusions."19 In contrast, Goebel's pur-
pose in claiming a common law heritage may have been not so much a
desire to promote judicial review as an Anglophilic belief that most of the
good in the American system had come from English common law.
Goebel stated that the "Sessions appeal consequently seems the most
likely source, unless one is prepared to concede a greater degree of in-
ventiveness than is otherwise observable in procedural matters."' Inca-
pable of seeing the early colonists as founding a judicial system that was
intentionally inventive, Goebel believed that the modem American system
owed its debt to subsequent English lawyers who brought with them the
common law and court practices to "crowd out the more rudimentary
practices and rules first imported and put to use."21
As long as fifty years ago, the eminent legal historian Willard Hurst
hinted at dissatisfaction with these types of stories of the history of the
appeal, noting that, "[n]o part of the history of United States courts pres-
ents such a tangle of detail as does the handling of appeals. Nor does the
tangled story unwind towards a happy solution." ' But regrettably the
story has remained tangled to the present perhaps because legal histori-
17. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE, supra note 10, at vi. Pound was one of many aca-
demics who, as political controversy over the legitimacy of the Lochner Court and the adminis-
trative state arose, turned back to discover the origins of judicial review and separation of pow-
ers. Indeed, the importance of the appeal became its relationship to the principle of judicial
review. For example, in 1913, Arthur Schlesinger explained that colonial appeals to the Eng-
lish Privy Council involved the important principle of American jurisprudence which accords to
the judiciary the power of declaring invalid an act of a subordinate legislature. Arthur Meier
Schlesinger, Colonial Appeals to the Privy Council, 28 POL. ScI. Q. 279, 279 (1913); see also
Elmer Beecher Russell, The Review of American Colonial Legislation by the King in Council, in
STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW (Faculty of Political Science at Columbia
University ed. 1915).
18. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE, supra note 10, at vii.
19. Id. at 105.
20. 1 GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 26.
21. Id. at 6.
22. JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAWMAKERS 101
(1950).
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ans, currently fascinated by the "law and society" approach,' turned
away from and became less interested in institutional legal history.24
23. George Haskins' pioneering work, Law and Authority, described the idea behind the
"law and society" approach:
The task of the historian of law is not merely one of recounting the growth and juris-
diction of courts and legislatures or of detailing the evolution of legal rules and doc-
trines. It is essential that these matters be related to the political and social environ-
ments of particular times and places .... Law is not simply a body of rules for the
settlement of justiciable controversies; law is both a product of, and a means of classi-
fying and bringing into order, complex social actions and interactions.
George Lee Haskins, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: A STUDY IN
TRADITION AND DESIGN viii (1960). Today, most legal historians accept this statement as a
starting point of analysis. See, e.g., HOFFER, supra note 9, at x-xii, 135-36.
24. Throughout the twentieth century, American legal historians have struggled with the
problem of how to discuss the development of courts and court systems. In a 1931 textbook,
Julius Goebel listed "all the factors that have entered into the development of a legal institu-
tion": "the political machine and the growth of the law"; "the process of legal development";
and "intellectual, social and economic factors conditioning legal development." JULIUS
GOEBEL, JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS (1931).
The institutional history approach argues that courts were "institutions" whose clearly deline-
ated boundaries could be placed in a story of narrative development over time. Seventeenth
century English writers like Edward Coke and Matthew Hale were the masters of the method
but many practiced it before and after them. See generally EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE
LAWS OF ENGLAND (reprint ed. 1985) (1817); MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (1820) [hereinafter HALE, COMMON LAW]. Almost everything
written on Rhode Island falls into this category. See, e.g., John T. Farrell, The Early History
of Rhode Island's Court System, (pts. 1-3),'9 R.I. HIST. 65-71, 103-17 (1950) 10 R.I. HIST. 14-
25 (1951); Amasa Eaton, The Development of the Judicial System in Rhode Island, 14 YALE L.
J. 148 (1904); THOMAS DURFEE, RHODE ISLAND HISTORICAL TRACT NO. 18, GLEANINGS
FROM THE JUDICIAL HISTORY OF RHODE ISLAND (1883); 3 THOMAS WILLIAMS BICKNELL,
THE HISTORY OF THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS 935-71
(1920). The classic work in Massachusetts is EMORY WASHBURN, SKETCHES OF THE JUDICIAL
HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS FROM 1630 TO THE REVOLUTION IN 1775 (1840). For an over-
view of all of the colonies, see Erwin C. Surrency, The Courts in the American Colonies, 11
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 253-76, 347-76 (1967).
The strength of this institutional approach has been its ability to combine archival detail
with narrative structure. Somewhere in the distant past, the institution was born and begun to
mature. Along the way it shed many of its youthful errors, for example, the failure to separate
legislative and judicial functions, the failure to use professional lawyers and judges, or the fail-
ure properly to understand judicial review. Although the narrative power of this approach is
alluring and perhaps somewhat unavoidable, the approach, as traditionally practiced, led to
problems. The fascination with dry technicality ignores questions of how or why developments
occurred. See Joseph H. Smith, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF LEGAL
INSTITUTIONS 2 (1965) (arguing for consideration of all factors affecting development of legal
institutions and the law). Indeed, often the appeal of institutional history has been that the tech-
nical chronology avoids explicit questions about institutional legitimacy even as it implicitly
ensures legitimacy by showing the "rootedness of current legal ideas in ancient ideas and prac-
tices" and then delineating progressively enlightened development towards the perfect (i.e.,
modern American) system. Stanley N. Katz, The Problem of a Colonial Legal History, in
July 1997]
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Certainly, as a recent English author notes, "[tlhe institutional approach
to the administration of justice tends to be arid, technical and dull. "'
And it is also true, as J.H. Baker points out, that institutional history
authors often "project their assumptions about courts onto earlier institu-
tions."26 Yet as Charles Gray notes, "legal developments are like neither
natural processes nor logical ones, for they have no inevitable out-
come."'27 For even if some think them dull, legal institutions continue to
mediate the intersection of both law and society, and law and politics.
This Article tugs the appeal out of histories about the developments
of the common law in America. Instead, it begins by studying the appeal
as a word and concept that carried a set of particular meanings. By
bringing these meanings to the surface, the Article sketches the begin-
nings of a different story of colonial legal culture-one which locates the
colonists within a transnational, transatlantic, Western European legal
culture. In this enterprise, I follow a path that perceptive cultural histori-
ans such as religious historian David Hall and others have laid, seeking to
COLONIAL BRITISH AMERICA: ESSAYS IN THE NEW HISTORY OF THE EARLY MODERN ERA 459
(Jack P . Greene & J.R. Pole, eds. 1984); see also id. at 480-81 (criticizing the "life-cycle"
approach).
Over the last half century, however, institutional legal history has fallen out of scholarly
fashion. The early institutional approaches were criticized and abandoned, as legal historians,
influenced by social history and intellectual history, became more interested in what courts de-
cided and who went to court than the existence of the court itself. See generally HOFFER, supra
note 9, at ix-xiv, 133-37; David H. Flaherty, An Introduction to Early American Legal History,
in ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW 3, 3-38 (1969); Katz, supra, at 457-89;
James Willard Hurst, Old and New Dimensions of Research in United States Legal History, 23
AM. J. LEG. HiST. 1 (1979); Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Colonial Courts and the Common Law, in
68 MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS 132-59 (1944-1947); John M. Mur-
rin, The Legal Transformation: The Bench and Bar of Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, in
COLONIAL AMERICA: ESSAYS IN POLITICS AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 415, 415-49 (Stanley
N. Katz ed. 1971); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-
1860 (1977). With the rise of the "law and society" school of legal history, ignoring the sur-
rounding society appeared intellectually old-fashioned. Yet in the excitement of showing law as
a product and means of classifying social interactions, legal historians may have neglected the
task of recounting the growth of courts. Only a few recent books attempt aspects of the story-
and they struggle to find an acceptable narrative and an intellectual respectability. See, e.g.,
G.S. ROWE, EMBATTLED BENCH: THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT AND THE FORGING
OF A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY, 1684-1809 (1994); J.M. SOSIN, THE ARISTOCRACY OF THE LONG
ROBE: THE ORIGINS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICA (1989); David Rossman, "Were there
no Appeal": The History of Review in American Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 518 (1990).
25. ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 10 (1985).
26. J.H. BAKER, The Changing Concept of a Court, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE
COMMON LAW: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 153, 153 (1986).
27. Charles M. Gray, Parliament, Liberty, and the Law, in PARLIAMENT AND LIBERTY
FROM THE REIGN OF ELIZABETH TO THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR 155, 155 (J.H. Hexter ed. 1992).
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explore and explicate "how structures of meaning emerge, circulate, and
are put to use. "'8 According to this perspective, the meanings that people
ascribe to their world resides, in part, in the words they use. Hall ex-
plains this idea in describing religious culture in seventeenth century New
England:
[Lay people] knew their way around symbolic language. When they
talked about their cows, they drew on a stock of precisely descriptive
words. But when they talked about things spiritual, they shifted to a
language made up out of words like "wilderness" and "pilgrim." ...
28. DAVID D. HALL, WORLDS OF WONDER, DAYS OF JUDGMENT: POPULAR RELIGIOUS
BELIEF IN EARLY NEW ENGLAND 245 (1990) (hereinafter HALL, WORLDS OF WONDER]. New
approaches to religious history would seem a particularly influential source for legal historians.
Like law, religion has a set of prescribed institutions, doctrines, appointed authorities, and
popular participants. Like law, religion seems to exist in some ambiguous, semi-autonomous
relationship with surrounding society. And just as religious history has moved towards the
question, "why does religion have power in society?" so too, legal history seems to move in-
creasingly towards "why does law have power?"
The words "culture" and "cultural history" are admittedly slippery; indeed, it is perhaps
their very amorphousness that has led to popularity. For example, Jack Greene has described
the idea of culture as "learned patterns of behavior and social interaction .... the socially ap-
proved material and social expressions of those behaviors .... [and] the symbolic representa-
tions... [that are] construct[ed] to endow... behaviors and experiences with larger meanings
and comprehensibility." JACK P. GREENE, IMPERATIVES, BEHAVIORS & IDENTITIES: ESSAYS
IN EARLY AMERICAN CULTURAL HISTORY ix (1992).
Nonetheless, "culture" has already begun to appear in legal history in myriad forms. Rhys
Isaac has adapted cultural history's anthropological methods to explore the ceremonies and oc-
casions of law such as court day. See RHYS ISAAC, THE TRANSFORMATION OF VIRGINIA:
1740-1790, at 88-94 (1982). A.G. Roeber has drawn on historians' use of the idea of particular
cultures to describe the world of the Virginia justices of the peace. See A.G. ROEBER,
FAITHFUL MAGISTRATES AND REPUBLICAN LAWYERS: CREATORS OF VIRGINIA LEGAL
CULTURE, 1680-1810 (1981). And a growing group of academics has begun to use the idea of
a culture of print to discuss the power of scribal and printed laws and legal literature on entire
communities and generations. See MICHAEL WARNER, THE LETTERS OF THE REPUBLIC:
PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1990); Warren
M. Billings, Justices, Books, Laws, and Courts in Seventeenth-Century Virginia, 85 L. LIB. J.
277 (1993); David D. Hall, The Chesapeake in the Seventeenth Century, in CULTURES OF
PRINT: ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF THE BOOK 97 (1996); Kathryn Preyer, Receiving the Law:
Reception Statutes and Reception Theory in the Late Eighteenth Century (1996) (unpublished
work in progress); Mary Sarah Bilder, Speaking in Writing: Why Did American Judges Publish
Written Opinions? (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). Indeed, the loose
idea of culture has become sufficiently ubiquitous that almost every author in a recent series of
essays reexamining colonial legal history mentioned the idea of legal culture. See WM. &
MARY Q. 3-42 (3d ser., Vol. L No. 1, 1993) (containing essays by Stanley Katz, Cornelia
Dayton, Terri Snyder, Richard Ross, and David Konig); see also Michael Kammen & Stanley
Katz, Bernard Bailyn, Historian and Teacher: An Appreciation, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF
EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY: SOCIETY, AUTHORITY, AND IDEOLOGY 9 (James A. Henretta et
al., eds. 1991).
For many, the meaning of a situation could be expressed in a word or
two-a word that may be meaningless to us... but that resonated with
significance in the context of this culture. 29
Words are therefore not mere "words;" they represent "well-charted
scripts" that can reveal deep-founded beliefs and ideologies. Thus when
people use particular words, they choose among different cultural
scripts-they select and create meaning. Indeed Hall asks, "What else is
culture but a set of scripts?"3"
Through this approach, the appeal emerges, not simply as a legal
procedure, but as a cultural script which should cause us to pause over
our lingering belief that the colonists possessed only a low-level under-
standing of English common law. The meaning of the appeals script
arose from the long heritage of canon and civil law in which a commit-
ment to equity required that a higher tribunal must be able to rehear and
redecide both the facts and law of an individual's case. The decisions to
adopt the appeals script betrayed the colonial leaders' careful knowledge
of English corporation law and their agreement with the broader, more
flexible, and more equitable theory of review and redress that the appeal
reflected. And in the political struggles over the location of supreme
authority which haunted the early seventeenth century, the appeals script
became an accepted part of the legal culture because it represented the
elusive idea of authority as dependent on a reciprocal exchange through a
practical, procedural form.
To connote and emphasize these underlying subtleties and complexi-
ties of the early colonial concept of "the appeal," I use the phrase, "cul-
ture of appeal." I mean by this phrase to suggest that the specialized
technical usage of the word in legal spheres was inseparable from its
more colloquial usage in the political sphere and that the term, "the ap-
peal," also referred to a set of broader meanings and practices. I also
intend the phrase to allude to a culture of understanding about the appeal
which transcended national and colonial boundaries. And the phrase
should also help readers, for whom the word "appeal" carries modem
common law connotations, to remember that the colonists' initial choice
of the appeal represented a moment of "deep cultural reorientation" away
from English common law culture.31 Lastly, the phrase should remind us
29. HALL, WORLDS OF WONDER, supra note 28, at 69-70.
30. Id. at 245.
31. ROEBER, supra note 28, at xv. The entire sentence is worth quoting: "Rather than
regard ideas as reflections, or even deceptions, advanced to 'explain' social or cultural change,
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that even the most technical of legal procedures, beneath their surface re-
flections, are embedded in the rich culture of their time.
The first part of this Article places the concept of appeal in the con-
text of the legal, religious, political, and literary cultures in England be-
fore the 1630s. I describe a world in which the word "appeal" was not
just a general word to describe complaints about courts. The "appeal"
carried a set of legal and political meanings that differed from the ideas
of justice and authority pervasive in the common law system. The sec-
ond part of the Article turns to Massachusetts and Rhode Island. I sug-
gest that the appeal initially appeared because of the corporate structure
of the colonial companies. The appeal remained because the cultural
meanings of the appeal melded easily with early colonial beliefs. When
political turmoil in England and the colonies in the 1640s raised questions
over the location of supreme authority, the appeal's ability to represent
the elusive idea of authority in a practical, procedural form ensured that
the appeal gained strength and acceptance within the colonies as it pro-
vided a rhetorical and practical method for colonists to discuss and rede-
fine the shape and scope of supreme authority. The conclusion offers a
few thoughts on the legacy of this rich, complex culture of appeal for our
modem American legal culture.
I. The English Culture of Appeal
Although the New England appeal represented a departure from the
English common law, it lay neatly within part of the English legal tradi-
tion. Since the fourteenth century, England had possessed two legal cul-
tures. One-the common law-saw itself as the product of an indigenous
development through custom by common-law practitioners and judges.32
The other-the civil law-proudly traced its roots to the grand tradition of
Roman law as applied in the ecclesiastical and civil law courts by the ci-
vilians. 3 Not only did these cultures have different stories of their ori-
we do better to consider how an apparent institutional, rhetorical stasis that once sprang from
and made sense to the participants of a vibrant, working culture can also obscure from later
generations the deep cultural reorientation that was occurring." Id.
32. J. H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 223-24 (3d ed. 1990)
[hereinafter BAKER, INTRODUCTION].
33. See generally DANIEL R. COQUILLETTE, THE CIVILIAN WRITERS OF DOCTORS'
COMMONS, LONDON, THREE CENTURIES OF JURISTIC INNOVATION IN COMPARATIVE
COMMERCIAL, AND INTERNATIONAL LAw (1988); R.H. HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND
ENGLISH COMMON LAW (1983) [hereinafter HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW AND ENGLISH COMMON
LAW]; R.H. HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW IN REFORMATION ENGLAND (1990) [hereinafter
HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW].
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gin, they had different procedures for redress. Although the word "ap-
peal" actually appeared in both cultures, it referred to very different legal
procedures.34
The civilian lawyer, John Cowell, explained in his 1607 dictionary,
The Interpreter, the difference between the understanding of the "appeal"
possessed by the civilian students of the Roman and canon law and their
common law colleagues. Cowell noted that "appeal is used in our com-
mon law divers times, as it is taken in the civil law: which is a removing
of a cause from an inferior judge to a superior as appeal to Rome ....
But it is more commonly used, for the private accusation, of a murdered
by a party ... "
As Cowell's phrase "divers times" indicates, the civil and common
law worlds were not completely separate and the civil law meaning of the
word "appeal" had already begun to drift into the common law. Yet
throughout the early seventeenth century, the concept of the "appeal" was
recognized as having its origins in the civil and canon law. During the
seventeenth century, as the power of the theory of redress represented by
the "appeal" began to invade the common law, these differences were not
lost on the New England colonists.
A. The Culture of Redress within the Common Law: The Writ of Error
Good sixteenth and seventeenth century common lawyers, and per-
haps an even wider spectrum of English readers, knew that the "appeal"
did not refer to common-law redress procedures. In 1628, Coke noted,
"Appellatio, is a removing of a cause in any ecclesiastical court to a su-
34. See 1 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 213-14 (7th ed. 1956)
(1903); 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 664 (2d ed. 1968). Not until 1875, when the common law
was merged with equity, did the "appeal" enter the English common law system as a procedure
for redress. BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 32, at 163. Today, the English appeal is un-
derstood technically to be a "rehearing" and the Court of Appeal "has very wide powers to
remedy deficiencies in the trial and the grounds of appeal are not restricted in any way."
WHITE, supra note 25, at 161-62, 169-73; see also MARTINEAU, supra note 9, at 5-19 (detail-
ing the English appellate system).
35. JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER. OR BOOKE CONTAINING THE SIGNIFICATION OF
WORDS (1607). On Cowell, see JOHN DYKSTRA EUSDEN, PURITANS, LAWYERS, AND
POLITICSIN EARLY SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 87-88 (1958); ROGER LOCKYER, THE
EARLY STUARTS: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 1603-1642, at 60 (1989). Cowell's
book was suppressed, so one cannot use the entry to show actual influence, but rather to reflect
the larger cultural understandings.
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perior. "36 He emphasized, however, "but of this there needeth no speech
in this place." 37 In an earlier widely popular book on English govern-
ment and law, Queen Elizabeth's Secretary of State, Thomas Smith,
similarly pointed out that "as for provocation or appeal which is used so
much in other countries, it hath no place in England."
31
What most common-law lawyers who looked up "appeal" would
have found was a discussion of felonies. The entry under "appeal" in the
popular 1579 edition of Rastell's Difficult and Obscure Words and Terms
of the Law of this Realm referred to an indictment by a private citizen for
mayhem, rape, robbery, murder, or other felonies. 39 Indeed, Smith ac-
knowledged England's eccentricity: "that which in England is called ap-
peal, [is] in other places [an] accusation."'
In the sixteenth and early seventeenth century, English common law
had no word to describe the ability to seek redress from an inferior to a
superior court. At that time the common law culture did not imagine a
world in which "inferior" and "superior" courts were an important dis-
tinction. English legal theory tended to see law as "a system of reason-
ing" working within a "system of remedies."41 The crucial issue was the
availability and applicability of various pleas and writs. The fascination
was more with the correctness of the process than the justness of the re-
sult. Although during the seventeenth century, Coke and then Hale
would develop increasingly elaborate understandings of the common law,
the common law remained a system in which pleas to the judiciary re-
36. 2 COKE, supra note 24, at 287.
37. Id. These two quotations appeared in a section on appeals of felony.
38. THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM: A DISCOURSE ON THE
COMMONWEALTH OF ENGLAND 108 (L. Alston reprint ed. 1972) (1583) [hereinafter SMITH,
DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM]. Smith was actually a civilian writer. De Republica "had ex-
traordinary success" going through ten editions between 1583 and 1640. COQUILLETTE, supra
note 33, at 58 n.230.
39. JOHN RASTELL, AN EXPOSITION OF CERTAIN DIFFICULT AND OBSCURE WORDES,
AND TERMES OF THE LAWES OF THIS REALME 19r-20 (reprint ed. 1969) (1579). A later edition
of the book noted that the appeal was also related to ecclesiastical proceedings described under
the term "Arches." [Rastell], LS TERMES DE LA LEY: OR, CERTAIN DIFFICULT AND
OBSCURE WORDS AND TERMS OF THE COMMON AND STATUTE LAWS OF ENGLAND, NOW IN
USE, EXPOUNDED AND EXPLAINED 37 (reprint ed. 1993) (1812). For other examples of the
dominance of the appeal of felony, see BRITTON 97-134 (W. W. Gaunt & Sons, Inc., 1983)
(1865); 1 COKE, supra note 24, at 287, 384-86; 3 id. at 130-31, 215, 237; HENRY FINCH, A
SUMMARY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND Tables 33 & 41 (David S. Berkowitz & Samuel
E. Thome, eds., reprint ed. 1979) (1654).
40. SMITH, DEREPUBLICA ANGLORUM, supra note 38, at 113-15.
41. MICHAEL LOBBAN, THE COMMON LAW AND ENGLISH JURISPRUDENCE 1760-1850, at
7(1991).
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quired addressing "reason"-"the faculty acquired by training that ex-
tracted some workable rules from a formless body of immemorial knowl-
edge"-not appealing for what any ordinary person could claim was jus-
tice, equity, or mercy."
Within this culture, therefore, disagreeing with the judgment was
tricky. If the law was what reason or custom allowed-or, at least, what
judges thought was allowed (and they tended to "think" in a funny ver-
sion of Latin and French)-then how was the lowly litigant to complain
about the result? During the medieval period, one possibility for redress
involved accusing the jury or judge of giving a false verdict.43 In es-
sence, the aggrieved party claimed that the judge or jury had lied about
what the judge or jury knew to be the correct verdict. Given the realities
of socio-economic power, accusing the judge (the writ of false judgment)
was unlikely to have seemed fruitful. And although accusing the jury
(the writ of attaint) remained an option for longer period of time, by the
beginning of the seventeenth century, it had fallen into disuse."
The other possibility for redress was the "writ of error," the claim
that an error had been made in the various writs and pleas of the case.45
Limited to the record, the writ of error permitted only a narrow scope of
review. The aggrieved party was not supposed to bring in new evidence;
indeed, the only debatable errors about factual matters involved facts that
would show that no judgment should have been entered in the first place.
One example was to prove that the original plaintiff had been a minor or
42. ALAN CROMARTIE, SIR MATTHEW HALE, 1609-1676: LAW, RELIGION, AND
NATURAL PHILOSOPHY 17 (1995); see generally Gerald J. Postema, Some Roots of our Notion
of Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 9, 16-17 (Laurence Goldstein ed. 1987). As Charles Gray
describes, around 1600, common-law lawyers believed that "an aboriginal and immemorial
body of law, made by no one but emerging somehow from the consensus of an unreachably re-
mote community and enduring ever since, was a historical reality." Gray, supra note 27, at
158.
43. On the availability of redress in medieval England, see Paul R. Hyams, Trial by Or-
deal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF
ENGLAND 90 (Morris S. Arnold, et al., eds. 1981).
44. See FINCH, supra note 39, at Table 47; 2 COKE, supra note 24, at 130. Attaint in-
volved accusing the jury of taking a false oath in front of even a larger jury. The larger jury's
verdict became the decision. See BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 32, at 156. In false
judgment, originally, the court's representatives were supposed to show up and defend the ac-
tion. See 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 34, at 667-68. Pollock and Maitland argued
that the "idea of a complaint against a judgment which is not an accusation against a judge is
not easily formed." Id. at 668.
45. On the procedures described in this paragraph, see 1 GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 19-20; BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 32, at 60-61,
163-64; 2 COKE, supra note 24, at 427.
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a woman. Review was, in essence, limited to errors of law. Even the
inquiry concerning errors of law was narrow because "errors" had to be
in the record and the "record" usually contained only the writ, the
pleadings and issue, the jury process and verdict, and judgment. A party
who felt that "manifest injustice" had occurred had to find justice by
"proof of a technical error (verbal or procedural) in the previous trial."I
The common-law culture of law also meant that common-law courts
did not operate in a strictly hierarchical fashion. If the law was what
judges thought it was, then one particular set of justices had no supreme
claim on knowing the law. Consequently, by 1600, the reviewing
authorities for the writ of error operated under a horizontal system of
"mutual review."' Although decisions of local courts of record were re-
viewed by King's Bench, the three central courts reviewed each other's
decisions in a complicated manner. Decisions in King's Bench were re-
viewed by justices from Common Pleas and the Exchequer. Decisions in
Common Pleas were reviewed by justices of King's Bench. Decisions in
the Exchequer were reviewed by justices of King's Bench and Common
Pleas. The House of Lords reviewed King's Bench and the Exchequer
Chamber.4" The review did not involve a rehearing of the case, and re-
viewed cases were returned to the court for further proceedings or new
trials.49 As one modem author comments, common law "appellate re-
view had nothing to do with whether justice was done."5"
46. THE TUDOR CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 149 (2d ed., G.R.
Elton ed. 1982) [hereinafter TUDOR CONSTITUTION]. Elton adds, "Even ingenuity could not
make this a satisfactory substitute for real appeal jurisdiction." Id. Unlike the appeal, the writ
of error was an original proceeding with the writ issuing from Chancery. The device of bill of
exceptions permitted inclusion of additional errors, but only if the judge recorded the ruling in
writing at judgment. See POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE, supra note 10, at 44-46.
47. Gray, supra note 27, at 165.
48. For sources detailing these procedures, see SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM, supra
note 38, at 156-69; Gray, supra note 27, at 164-65; HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 244-45;
BAKER, supra note 32, at 158; POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE, supra note 10, at 57; Julius
Goebel Jr., The Matrix of Empire, in SMITH, APPEALS, supra note 15, at xxxvi. The review of
King's Bench to Common Pleas and Exchequer had been added under Elizabeth. An Act For
Redress of Erroneous Judgments in the Court Commonly Called the King's Bench, 1585, 27
Eliz., ch. 8; An Act Against Discontinuances of Writs of Error in the Courts of Exchequer and
King's Bench, 1589, 31 Eliz., ch. 1; see TUDOR CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, at 150.
49. BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 32, at 157; POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE,
supra note 10, at 57; MARTINEAU, supra note 9, at 2-6.
50. MARTINEAU, supra note 9, at 6.
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B. The Culture of Redress Outside of Common Law: The Appeal
The common law courts, however, were not the only courts in Eng-
land. Justice on the merits appeared to be the point of redress elsewhere,
and redress elsewhere was by the appeal. In the 1607 dictionary, Cowell
described the appeal as "a removing of a cause from an inferior judge to
a superior as appeal to Rome.""1 His definition once again embodied
many of the cultural understandings of the "appeal." Cowell associated
the appeal with the civil law and Rome and, indeed, the appeal dominated
the ecclesiastical courts and the courts that used the civil law. Within
these courts, the appeal served as a flexible form of redress based on an
increasingly important understanding of equity advanced by the civilians.
Cowell's use of the word "remove" emphasized the power of the appeal
to permit a complete rehearing of both law and fact. His description of
the removal from an "inferior" to a "superior" judge hinted that the le-
gitimacy of the appeal rested ultimately on a supreme authority-often the
authority of God. Moreover, Cowell's casual mention of "Rome" sig-
naled that the appeal carried a set of political memories. First as a sym-
bol of Rome's authority and then as a symbol of the king, the appeal had
been entwined into English political history.
(1) Equity, Authority, and the Appeal in Ecclesiastical Courts
As of the seventeenth century, the appeal's origins stretched back as
far as the Catholic church could remember. By the time of Justinian,
Roman law had developed an appeal. This appeal basically was a re-
hearing which permitted the production of new evidence. 2 An early in-
stance of this Roman appeal appears in the Bible in Acts, which recounts
Paul's journey from Jerusalem to Rome. At a crucial moment, when it
appeared that Paul would be sent back from Caesarea to Jerusalem for
51. COWELL, supra note 35.
52. See H.F. JOLOWICZ & BARRY NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF ROMAN LAW 444 (3d ed. 1972); see also BRIAN RAPSKE, THE BOOK OF ACTS IN ITS
FIRST CENTURY SETTING 48-56 (1994). The Republic recognized provocatio, the right of the
citizen to appeal to the people from a death sentence. See JOLowIcz & NICHOLAS, supra, at
306-17. By the Principate (circa 27 b.c.e. - 235 c.e.), appeals in many cases became a "regular
institution." Id. at 400. Appeals above a certain amount could be taken to the emperor. Under
Justinian (527-565 c.e.), a litigant was allowed no more than two appeals. Frivolous appeals
were "discouraged by pecuniary penalties." Id. at 444.
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trial, Paul stated, "I appeal to Caesar."53 Festus and the Council ac-
cepted Paul's appeal and sent him to Rome.54
As a legal device, the Roman appeal melded well with Church hier-
archy. By the eleventh century, Pope Gregory VII clarified that "the
pope stood supreme above all others. "' Although the pope therefore
"had to listen to all complaints," Gregory emphasized the system of ap-
peal to permit the delegation of cases while maintaining papal judicial su-
premacy. 6 By the end of the twelfth century, "the Church and its legal
administrators had constructed a transnational hierarchy of tribunals with
the pope at its apex."57 The appeal was part of this pyramidal hierarchy.
Within England, an appeal moved from the local courts in the diocese to
the courts of the archbishops, and then to the courts of the Pope.58 This
ecclesiastical appeal had few procedural requirements. Holdsworth noted
that there was an "almost unlimited right of appeal to the Pope" and that
"the system of appeals and rehearings was, or might be, never ending."
59
Indeed, with a new Pope, cases often could be reappealed. °
The appeal's association with papal power meant that the cultural
understanding of the appeal involved far more than simply seeing it as a
procedural device. The appeal was at the center of two significant politi-
cal struggles between the English crown and Rome. The first conflict in-
volved Archbishop Thomas Becket. In 1164, Henry II proposed the
53. Acts 25: 11-12.
54. Id.; see THE ANCHOR BIBLE: THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES 234 (Johannes Munch ed.
1967). On Paul and the appeal, see RAPSKE, supra note 52; HANS CONZELMANN, ACTS OF
THE APOSTLES: A COMMENTARY ON THE ACTS OF THE APOSTLES 203-4, 207, 212 (James
Limburg, et al., trans., Eldon Jay Epp & Christopher R. Matthews, ed. 1987); H.W. TAIRA,
THE TRIAL OF ST. PAUL: A JURIDICAL EXEGESIS OF THE SECOND HALF OF THE ACTS OF THE
APOSTLES 142-71 (1989).
55. John Gilchrist, Canon Law Aspects of the Eleventh-Century Gregorian Reform Pro-
gramme 27, reprinted in CANON LAW IN THE AGE OF REFORM, 11TH-12TH CENTURIES (1993)
[hereinafter Gilchrist, Canon Law Aspects].
56. John Gilchrist, Gregory VI and the Juristic Sources of His Ideology, 16-21, 25-26,
reprinted in CANON LAW IN THE AGE OF REFORM, 1 1TH-12TH CENTURIES, supra note 55; see
also Gilchrist, Canon Law Aspects, supra note 55, at 27-30 (describing Gregory's delegation
policies).
57. BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 32, at 147.
58. See id. The court structure of the church was more complicated than this brief de-
scription. For a more detailed description, see generally MARTIN INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS,
SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND, 1570-1640, at 35-37 (1987) [hereinafter INGRAM, CHURCH
COURTS]; G.I.O. DUNCAN, THE HIGH COURT OF DELEGATES 1-31 (1971).
59. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 603.
60. Id.
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Constitutions of Clarendon.61 The eighth chapter substituted the king for
the Pope as the place of appeal in case the archbishop failed to do "jus-
tice."62 Not surprisingly, Becket disagreed and protested the attempt to
end the Pope's appellate jurisdiction. Becket maintained the Pope's
power of appeal but at a price-his own violent death at the hands of the
king's men at Christmas in Canterbury Cathedral. 63
Almost four hundred years later, the English kings resurrected the
struggle in a more successful, if not less bloody fashion. Pressured by
the desire for a legitimate male heir and for an end to his marriage with
Katherine of Aragon, Henry VIII needed to prevent any future appeal by
Katherine to the Pope. The act, For the Restraint of Appeals, passed in
1533, reached beyond Henry's particular situation to end all appeals to
the Pope.' Drafted by Thomas Cromwell, the act declared the king the
supreme head of the church of England. Using language that would be-
come part of the cultural script for anyone complaining about appeals, the
act stated that appeals would be restrained because they were often
brought for "the delay of justice" and created "great inquietation, vexa-
tion, trouble, cost and charges."' Moreover, the "great distance" meant
that necessary proofs, witnesses, and "true knowledge of the cause"
could not be known and therefore the aggrieved party would be "without
remedy. "'
Ending appeals to the Pope did not end the enormous influence of
the ecclesiastical courts and the ecclesiastic appeal procedure. The aboli-
61. CONSTITUTIONS OF CLARENDON, in SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS
OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 165 (William Stubbs ed., Fred B. Rothman & Co. re-
print ed. 1985) (1921).
62. Id. at ch. 8 (Et si archiepiscopus defuerit in justitia).
63. See DAVID KNOWLES, THOMAS BECKEr 88-92, 171 (1971); CHARLES DUGGAN, 1
CANON LAW IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 370 (1982); WILLIAM HOLDEN HUTTON, THOMAS
BECKET: ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY 153-78 (1926).
64. For the Restraint of Appeals, 1532, 24 Hen. 8, ch. 12; see also The Submission of the
Clergy and Restraint of Appeals, 1533, 25 Hen. 8, ch. 19.
65.' For the Restraint of Appeals, 1532, 24 Hen. 8, ch. 12.
66. For further commentary on the 1533 Act, see DUNCAN, supra note 58, at 6-13;
HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW, supra note 33, at 34-38; RALPH HOULBROOKE, CHURCH
COURTS AND THE PEOPLE DURING THE ENGLISH REFORMATION, 1520-1579, at 8-14 (1979);
JAMES C. SPALDING, REFORMATION OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1552, at
14-18 (1992); G.R. ELTON, THE TUDOR REVOLUTION IN GOVERNMENT 362-64 (1953). The
second act in restraint of appeals provided that appeals from the archbishop's court would be to
the King in the Court of Chancery and heard by commissioners and that the party grieved had
fifteen days after judgment to appeal. 25 Henry 8, ch. 19. For a discussion of the drafting of
the statute, see G.R. Elton, The Evolution of a Reformation Statute, 44 ENG. HIST. REV. 174-
97 (1949).
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tion of appeals had "simply varied the place to which appealed causes fi-
nally went."67 The "omnipresent" courts continued to handle causes in-
volving marriage and separation, probate and intestate estates, slander
and defamation, as well as heresy, witchcraft, usury, profanity, and sex-
ual offenses.' With only one brief interruption during the reign of Mary,
the ecclesiastical appeal continued into the seventeenth century with the
crown as head of both spiritual and temporal jurisdictions.69 And as
popular legal writers from Lambarde to Coke noted, appeals now ran
from the courts of the archbishop to a new body commissioned by the
crown, the Court of Delegates. 70 The Delegates maintained civil law
procedures of the ecclesiastical system: the appeal was conducted in
writing, in English, with depositions and interrogatories. It was under-
stood as a rehearing of both law and fact.7'
Beyond serving as the symbol of fundamental political struggles and
the vast jurisdiction of the English church over daily life, the appeal also
stood as an equitable theory of justice arising from medieval Roman
canon law. In the medieval ecclesiastical system, "the aspiration to do
full justice between the parties led to an appellate process in which all
questions were open that had been open in the proceeding appealed
from."' After the Henrician Reformation, ecclesiastical justice was ex-
plicitly linked to "equity." One popular writer noted that "where the /us
civile establishes equity and the ius canonicum formality, the ius civile
prevails even in the ecclesiastical forum."73 Similarly, in one of the
sixty-one chapters addressing appeals in the proposed revisions to the
67. HELMHOLz, ROMAN CANON LAW, supra note 33, at 38.
68. INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, supra note 58, at 1-69. See PATRICK COLLINSON, THE
RELIGION OF PROTESTANTS: THE CHURCH IN ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1559-1625 (1982).
69. The changes were reversed under Mary Tudor. However, the first act of Elizabeth's
reign restored the restraint on appeals and the supremacy of the crown in temporal and spiritual
jurisdictions. An Act to Restore to the Crown the Ancient Jurisdiction over the Estate Ecclesi-
astical and Spiritual, and Abolishing All Foreign Powers Repugnant to the Same, 1558, 1 Eliz.,
ch. 1, §4.
70. WILLIAM LAMBARDE, ARCHEION, OR A DISCOURSE UPON THE HIGH COURTS OF
JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 14 (Charles H. McIlwain & Paul L. Ward eds., 1957) (1635); 4 COKE,
supra note 24, at 339-40. See INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, supra note 58, at 2-3, 35-41;
DUNCAN, supra note 58, at 1-31.
71. See HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW, supra note 33, at 45-47, 155-56; JOHN
DAWSON, THE ORACLES OF THE LAW 188 (1968).
72. ROBERT E. RODES, JR., ECCLESIASTICAL ADMINISTRATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND:
THE ANGLO-SAXONS TO THE REFORMATION 142 (1977).
73. ROBERTUS MARANTA, SPECULUM AUREUM Er LUMEN ADVOCATORUM PRAXIs
CIVILIS, Part II, no. 76 (Venice 1556), quoted in HELMHOLZ, ROMAN CANON LAW, supra
note 33, at 17.
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canon law in England in 1552, thirty-two of England's most prominent
common lawyers, civilians, bishops, and divines wrote:
Appeals are procured not for the sake of oppressing anyone's justice,
but so that imposed grievances inflicted may be repaired, and to correct
injustice, and the unskillfulness of the judge, and sometimes to come to
the aid of the ignorance of the afflicted one himself .... For what has
been omitted in the first instance frequently has a place in the second. 74
The connection between equity and ecclesiastical law lasted into the
seventeenth century. In 1607, Sir Thomas Ridley's A View of Civil and
Ecclesiastical Law noted that the study of civil and ecclesiastical law was
called "Aequitas Canonica" because of the "cases of Equity and Con-
science."75
Indeed, in the sixteenth century, the civilians practicing in the eccle-
siastical courts had developed an elaborate theory of equity, and its com-
panion, "conscience." "Equity" was an ancient word-Aristotle and
Aquinas had discussed epieikeia.76 "Conscience" had a similar heritage
reaching back as far as the fourteenth century.' Both words, however,
became ubiquitous after 1530 with the civilian writer St. German's publi-
cation of Doctor and Student in English. This influential work defined
equity as "a righteousness that considers all the particular circumstances
of the deed the which also is tempered with the sweetness of mercy.""
According to scholars, St. German theorized that "equitable interventions
in the name of good conscience, which were sometimes necessary to
74. SPALDING, supra note 66, 246-47. The Reformato legum ecclesiasticarum never
passed. The Reformatio defined appeal as "a claim from a lesser to a greater, and through this,
when legitimately interposed and pronounced, both the jurisdiction of the judge is suspended for
the case and his investigation and examination is transferred to a higher [court]." Id. at 239.
On the background of the Reformatio, see id. at 36-44.
75. J. DODD, A HISTORY OF CANON LAW 50-51 (quoting Ridley). On Ridley, see
COQUILLETTE, supra note 33, at 101-24.
76. The history of the equity and conscience is long, complex, and beyond the scope of
this Article. Discussions can be found in CHRISTOPHER ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT
xx-li (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., Selden Society 1974); J.A. GUY, CHRISTOPHER
ST. GERMAN ON CHANCERY AND STATUTE 71-75 (1985); 1 LORD NOTTINGHAM'S CHANCERY
CASES xxxvii-cxxiv (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1957); THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 37-43
(John H. Baker ed., 1978). See also EDWARD HAKE, EPIEIKEA: A DIALOGUE ON EQUITY IN
THREE PARTS xiii-xxv (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1953) (rev. ed. 1603); NORMAN DOE,
FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAw 84, 101-107 (1990); BAKER,
INTRODUCTION, supra note 32, at 122-24; PETER HOFFER, THE LAW'S CONSCIENCE:
EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 7-12 (1990).
77. ST. GERMAN, supra note 76, at xli; 1 LORD NOTTINGHAM'S CHANCERY CASES, SU-
pra note 76, at xxxviii.
78. ST. GERMAN, supra note 76, at 95.
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mitigate the rigor of common law, were designed to reinforce, not to
contradict, general legal principles."79 Unlike Aquinas who thought eq-
uity should be reserved for exceptional interventions, under St. German's
theories, equity was "a part of the law not something outside of it."8"
Equity "followeth the law in all particular cases where right and Justice
requireth."81 Equity arose from conscience. St. German wrote:
And as a light is set in a lantern that all that is in the house may be seen
thereby so almighty god hath set conscience in the midst of every rea-
sonable soul as a light whereby he may discern and know what he ought
to do: and what he ought not to do.82
Conscience was more than the distinction between right and wrong,
it was a form of "applied knowledge," an "art of translating" the distinc-
tion into "specific rules of conduct to be followed in particular situa-
tions."83 Judgments in the ecclesiastical and civil law courts were to be
based on equity and conscience.
Into the seventeenth century, these understandings of equity and the
appeal remained linked. Even a common lawyer like Coke grasped the
essential meaning. In Coke's discussion of ecclesiastical courts, he stated
that the "appeal is a natural defence" and cannot be taken away "by any
prince or power.' He added, if the appeal is "just and lawful, the supe-
rior judge ought of right and equity to receive and admit the same, as he
ought to do justice to the subjects."' As one modem historian notes,
common lawyers and civilians alike knew that the appeal considered "the
merits of the whole cause."86
(2) The Ripples of Appeal
This understanding of the appeal as equity and justice, as superior
and inferior courts, and as rehearings of law and fact rippled into other
areas of English legal life. The martial and admiralty courts had long ac-
cepted the appeal and its meanings because of their reliance on civil law
79. GuY, supra note 76, at 19-20.
80. Id. at 73 (noting that St. German's concept of equity followed the theories of Parisian
theologian Jean Gerson, 1363-1429).
81. ST. GERMAN, supra note 76, at 97.
82. Id. at 95. Indeed, chapter xv defined "conscience"; chapter xvi defined "equity."
83. Barton, Introduction to ST. GERMAN, supra note 76, at xxvi.
84. 4 CoKE, supra note 24, at 340.
85. Id.; see also DUNCAN, supra note 58, at 54-55.
86. DUNCAN, supra note 58, at 43.
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procedures.87 During the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century,
this meaning of the "appeal" as an equitable rehearing in front of a supe-
rior authority began to spread to two new legal areas in England. The
gradual association of the "appeal" with these two areas that emphasized
the appeal's association with equity and the delegation of authority dem-
onstrates that a "fairly coherent, though hardly articulated" theory of law
had grown up around the appeal.88
At the beginning of the seventeenth century, the word "appeal" be-
gan consistently to appear in conjunction with discussions of the Chan-
cery courts. The Chancery courts, theoretically originating from the
crown, did not use common-law procedure. Like the ecclesiastical
courts, Chancery emphasized the importance of equity and an examina-
tion, in English, into the peculiar circumstances of the party.89 Indeed,
the civilians had so often used "equity" to justify Chancery jurisdiction
that by the seventeenth century, the two words seemed interchangeable.
87. Coke noted that an admiralty "appeal" goes to the lord Admiral and an "appeal to the
king" exists in martial law proceedings. 4 COKE, supra note 24, at 123-25, 340. The admi-
ralty appeal was very old. See SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY, 1364-1471, at 124 (William
Paley Baildon ed., 1896); For the Avoiding of Tedious Suits in Civil and Maritime Causes,
1565, 1 Eliz., ch. 5. Hale also used the word "appeal" in conjunction with Parliament rehear-
ing a sentence in an Admiralty court. See MATrHEw HALE, THE PREROGATIVES OF THE KING
187 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1976) [hereinafter HALE, PREROGATIVES]; LouIs A. KNAFLA, LAW
AND POLITICS IN JACOBEAN ENGLAND: THE TRACTS OF LORD CHANCELLOR ELLESMERE 259
(1977). Indeed, the Court of Delegates became the final Appellate tribunal for these courts, as
well as the university courts. DUNCAN, supra note 58, at 32-33; 4 COKE, supra note 24, at
339. Admiralty, Chivalry, Star Chamber, and Chancery are discussed in R. CROMPTON,
L'AUTHORTIE ET JURISDICTION DES COURTS DE LA MAJESTIE DE LA ROYGNE (1594). Hale
discussed these courts together because they used civil and canon law. 1 HALE, COMMON
LAw, supra note 24, at 34. These courts were seen as peculiarly connected to the king and are
now designated as "prerogative courts." THEODORE F. T. PLUCKNETr, A CONCISE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAw 176 (5th ed. 1956); BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 32, at 135-43.
88. Charles M. Gray, Boundaries of the Equitable Function, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 192,
223 (1976).
89. See generally WILLIAM WEST, SYMBOLAEOGRAPHIA (1590); HAKE, supra note 76; T.
ASHE, EPIEIKEIA (1609). Chancery usually heard cases through subpoena and the "English
bill." On Chancery procedures, see IT.] POWELL, ATrOURNEYS ACADEMY: OR MANNER
AND FORME OF PROCEEDING, UPON ANY SUITE, PLAINT, OR ACTION, IN ANY COURT OF
RECORD, ESPECIALLY IN THE GREAT COURT AT WESTMINSTER, WITH FEES 1-5, 38 (1623);
LORD NOTTINGHAM'S 'MANUAL OF CHANCERY PRACTICE' AND 'PROLEGMENA OF CHANCERY
AND EQUITY 45-48 (D.E.C. Yale ed., 1965) [hereinafter LORD NOTTINGHAM'S 'MANUAL'];
William J. Jones, Due Process and Slow Process in the Elizabethan Chancery, 6 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 123, 129-30 (1962); BAKER, INTRODUCTION, supra note 32, at 119-30; DONALD VEALL,
THE POPULAR MOVEMENT FOR LAW REFORM 32-36 (1970).
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The popular Lambarde's Archeion (1635), a text on English legal institu-
tions, simply titled one section: "The Court of Equity, or Chancery."90
The precise date during the early seventeenth century when the "ap-
peal" became the descriptive word for grievances brought to and taken
from the Chancery courts is not clear. The phrase "appeal to the kings
court of chancery" appears as early as the Henriciant act restraining ap-
peals.91 According to one contemporary treatise, Chancery heard "ap-
peals" from maritime and martial matters and from the "mayor of the
Staple." 92 And in 1591, a petition in Chancery stated that the "appeal"
was the proper device when complaining about a difference between the
facts and the judgment.93
Nevertheless, by the 1620s, the appeal also had become linked to the
idea of broad equitable redress in Chancery, as a series of House of
Lords' discussions demonstrate. In the 1620s, the Lords began to discuss
whether, and with what scope, they could review Chancery decisions.
The issue was framed as to whether they could hear "appeals."' In
1620, a petition brought to the House of Lords employed the word "ap-
peal," giving rise to a discussion "whether it be a formal appeal for mat-
ter of justice or no."' Lord Say argued that it was an appeal and that
90. LAMBARDE, supra note 70, at 37; see ST. GERMAN, supra note 76, at 105; GuY, su-
pra n&e 76, at 67-68; SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM, supra note 38, at 153, 155, 156.
91. The Submission of the Clergy and Restraint of Appeals, 1633, 25 HENRY 8, ch. 19.
92. A Treatise of the Maisters of Chaunceries, in COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 307, 310 (London, T. Wright pub., Francis Hargrave ed., 1787) (ca.
1596-1603).
93. Sames v. Beecher (July 23, 1591), in ACTS CANCELLARIAE; OR, SELECTIONS FROM
THE RECORDS OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY 613-14 (Cecil Monro, ed., 1847). The petition
implied that appeals could not be taken from decisions in the Chancery. The masters stated that
the decree "is very just, and grounded upon good and sufficient causes and reasons, allowed in
the law of nature and in civil law, and upon good equity and conscience." Id. at 614. The ap-
peal and Chancery even appeared in efforts to limit Chancery's powers. For example, in 1591,
William Lambarde wrote in a discussion on Chancery that "equity should not be appealed unto
but only in rare and extraordinary matters." LAMBARDE, supra note 70, at 44.
94. Indeed, the House of Lords' search for an "appellate remedy from equity courts" pro-
vided additional discussions of appeals. See JAMES S. HART, JUSTICE UPON PETITION: THE
HOUSE OF LORDS AND THE REFORMATION OF JUSTICE, 1621-1675, at 106-11 (1991). For ex-
ample, in 1621 the Act for the Reversing of Decrees in Equity Courts upon Just Cause was in-
troduced. The review board was to consist of the two chief Justices, the Chief Baron and the
Lord Keeper. For criticism, see George Norburie, The Abuses and Remedies of Chancery, in A
COLLECTION OF TRACTS RELATIVE TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND 425, 427-48 (Francis Hargrave
ed., 1787) (ca. 1620).
95. 103 NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 107-8 (S. R. Gardiner ed.,
Camden Soc. pub., London 1870) (1621), quoted in HART, supra note 94, at 46.
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there was "no appeal from the Chancery but hither. " 96 The Committee
concluded that it could not find "that the word 'appeal' is usual in any
petition for any matter to be brought hither."' Nonetheless, the House
heard the accusation and a "number of members expressed a willingness
to consider the substance of the case, as an appeal," that is, to hear the
merits of the cause. 98 By the mid-to-late seventeenth century, the "appeal
in equity" was well ensconced within Chancery's practice and, in 1675,
the House of Lords accepted jurisdiction over "appeals in equity" from
Chancery. 99
The meaning of "appeal" is also revealed as the appeal spread be-
yond the ecclesiastical courts into the quasi-governmental entities that
English legal culture referred to as "franchises." Franchises were "a
miscellaneous lot"-the palatine of Durham, the county of Chester, vari-
ous local warrens, and corporations. 1" These franchises were all "exer-
cises of the king's rights by private persons"01 ; they involved the "dele-
gation of various jura regalia." 10' Crucial to the franchise was the patent
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 47; MATTHEW HALE, THE JURISDICTION OF THE LORDS HOUSE, OR
PARLIAMENT 195 (Francis Hargraves ed., 1796). The decision by the common-law courts to
begin using the action of praemunire to bar Chancery from rehearing cases decided at common
law suggests that the common-law culture sensed that these rehearings were akin to appeals.
Praemunire was an old action which had generally been used to stop ecclesiastical appeals to
Rome. 25 Hen. 8, ch. 21. In 1616, Bacon and Ellesmere complained successfully to James
that Coke's actions undercut Chancery and equity. An official decree in July 1616 stated that
Chancery could continue to give "relief in equity (notwithstanding any former proceedings at
the common law against them)." J.H. Baker, The Common Lauyers and the Chancery: 1616,
in THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW 205, 222 (1986); KNAFLA, supra note 87,
at 168-81; HART, supra note 94, at 28; LOCKYER, supra note 35, at 58.
99. The legitimacy of the appeal from Chancery to the House of Lords was finally settled
in 1675 in Shirley v. Fagg. Lord Nottingham refers extensively to the appeal linking it to con-
science and equity in the 1670s. 1 LORD NOTTINGHAM'S CHANCERY CASES, supra note 76, at
cvii-cxx; LORD NOTTINGHAM'S 'MANUAL', supra note 89, at 184; see also HALE,
PREROGATIVES, supra note 87, at 181.
Julius Goebel accepted that the Chancery appeal had no direct influence on the colonial de-
velopment of the appeal. He noted that the colonial appeal could not "have been in imitation of
the English Chancery appeal, for this was still, so to speak, in ventre sa mere when the first
American enactments were put on the books." 1 GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT,
supra note 3, at 26. (The phrase translates as "a child while yet in its mother's womb.")
Thanks to Michael Ansaldi for the translation.
100. DONALD W. SUTHERLAND, QUO WARRANTO PROCEEDINGS IN THE REIGN OF
EDWARD I, 1278-1294, at 5 (1963).
101. Id.
102. SELECT CHARTERS OF TRADING COMPANIES, 1530-1707 xxvii (Cecil T. Carr ed.,
1913) [hereinafter SELECT CHARTERS]. Prior to the sixteenth century, within these franchises
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or charter, a document that literally was to be kept under lock and key."1 3
Subject to the document, however, the franchise could develop its own
system of courts." 4 A number of franchise courts had long employed the
appeal. The corporate university courts of Oxford and Cambridge had
used appeals to review internal cases." ° Another franchise court-the
Stannary Courts of Cornwall and Devon-did not permit reversals by
writ of error to the king but only by the appeal." And the islands of Jer-
sey and Guernsey had appeals to the King in Council."t Within these
franchises, the appeal represented the hierarchy of authority of the dele-
gated powers.
"the king's writ did not run and the king's peace did not prevail." SUTHERLAND, supra note
100, at 5. In 1536, Henry VII made the franchises subject to the Crown's jurisdiction by re-
quiring that writs run in the King's name. TUDOR CONSTrrUTION, supra note 46, at 32, 37-39;
Harold Garrett-Goodyear, The Tudor Revival of Quo Warranto and Local Contributions to State
Building, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 231, 268-71 (Morris S. Arnold et al.
eds., 1981). Hale lumped together franchises of boroughs, counties and corporations. HALE,
PREROGATIVES, supra note 87, at 240-46.
103. The Inner and Middle Temple kept their patent of 1608 "in an iron box, locked with
two padlocks, deposited under the communion table in the Temple church, and periodically in-
spected." EUSDEN, supra note 35, at 53. The Rhode Island patent of 1644 was to be "kept in
a strong chest, having four several Locks annexed thereto, and that each Town keep a key
thereof, that so, as there is a common right and interest therein, there may be no access unto
them in a divided way, (lest also, they be divided,) but with a common consent." 1 RECORDS
OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS IN NEW ENGLAND 196
(John Russell Bartlett ed., 1856) [hereinafter RHODE ISLAND RECORDS].
104. The various franchises and outlying areas had different judicial systems. The courts in
the palatines appear to have operated as mixed courts of law and equity, although they do not
seem to have used the appeal. HALE, PREROGATIVES, supra note 87, at 209; BAKER,
INTRODUCTION, supra note 32, at 140 n. 19. The Council in the North had an equitable juris-
diction and operated similarly to Chancery. See R.R. REID, THE KING'S COUNCIL IN THE
NORTH 64-66, 260-79, 297-315 (1921). The County Palatine of Durham was under the Bishop
of Durham and after 1536 ran Durham as the chancellor. See GAILLARD THOMAS LAPSELY,
THE COUNTY PALATINE OF DURHAM: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 196-200
(1900). On the marches, see HOWARD PEASE, THE LORD WARDENS OF THE MARCHES OF
ENGLAND AND SCOTLAND 187 (1913). According to Coke, the form of redress in the County
Palatine of Chester and of Durham was writ of error to the King's Bench. 4 COKE, supra note
24, at 212-15, 218-19.
105. DUNCAN, supra note 58, at 40; 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 169-70; 4 COKE,
supra note 24, at 227-28.
106. 1 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 156-58 (discussing a procedure involving an appeal
to the court of the Vice-Warden, then to the Lord Warden, then to the Council of the Duchy); 4
COKE, supra note 24, at 229-30.
107. 1 HOLDSwORTH, supra note 34, at 520; SMITH, APPEALS, supra note 15, at 3-38.
Coke did not state that appeals ran to the King from the island but only that the king's writ did
not run there. 4 COKE, supra note 24, at 286-87. It seems likely that the early appeal language
in the Guernsey charters arose from civil and ecclesiastical law. Smith did note the possibility
that it was a "Norman institutional survival." SMITH, APPEALS, supra note 15, at 11.
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In the late sixteenth century, franchises like the English trading
companies also began to use the appeal to describe the relationship be-
tween the crown and the company. The charters of the trading compa-
nies delegated to the governor and company the power to do justice and
to pass laws not contrary or repugnant to the laws of England.' In some
cases, the crown acknowledged that the company had complete legal
authority by specifically barring appeals beyond the company. John
Wheeler's famous Treatise on Commerce, published in 1601, described
the Merchant Adventurers' power to "end and determine all Civil causes,
questions, and controversies ... without Appeal, provocation, or decli-
nation."'09 The charter to the King's Merchants of the New Trade stated
that there would be no "further appeal or provocation whatever" from the
power and authority of the Company and Fellowship. 0 The Levant
company's 1615 charter permitted fines for anyone who appealed to
Turkish authorities.'
Not only was the appeal used to indicate the delegation of power
from crown to corporation, but it also began to be used to delegate power
within the corporation. The judicial structure of the corporations was
governed by internal acts passed by their general court. In at least one
known case, that of the Eastland Merchants, a trading company active in
the Baltic since the fifteenth century, internal ordinances established the
appeal.112 Their 1579 charter established a Governor, Deputy, and
twenty-four assistants."' As merchants from all over England joined the
company, they demanded local courts." 4 The London Court agreed but
retained control over the local courts by regulating the "appeal." The
108. DOUGLAS R. BISSON, THE MERCHANT ADVENTURERS OF ENGLAND: THE COMPANY
AND THE CROWN, 1474-1564, at 3 (1993) (generally describing the charters). On the trading
corporations in general, see 1 WILLIAM ROBERT SCOTT, THE CONSTITmON AND FINANCE OF
ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, at 5-12 (1951); PERCIVAL
GRIFFITHS, A LICENSE TO TRADE: THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH CHARTERED COMPANIES
(1974); 1 ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 1-52, 98-108, 431-39.
109. JOHN WHEELER, A TREATISE OF COMMERCE 156 (George Burton Hotchkiss ed.,
1931) (1601).
110. SELECT CHARTERS, supra note 102, at 88.
111. MORDECAI EPSTEIN, THE ENGLISH LEVANT COMPANY 103 (B. Franklin ed., 1968)
(1908). The appeal language may date back to the Elizabethan 1564 charter of the King's Mer-
chants. The delegation of the power to do justice language may date back to the 1407 charter to
the Merchant Adventurers. SELECT CHARTERS, supra note 102, at xxi-xxii.
112. See ACTS AND ORDINANCES OF THE EASTLAND COMPANY ix-xi (Maud Sellers ed.,
1906) [hereinafter ACTS AND ORDINANCES].
113. Id. at xiii.
114. Id. at lxi-lxii.
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Privy Council approved an appeals ordinance in 1617, although the ordi-
nance may have recodified a similar older ordinance. The ordinance dis-
cussed in "what cases appeals are made," noting that it was intended for
the "avoiding of needless and unjust appeals."' The ordinance distin-
guished among appeals on monetary amount. It prohibited appeals from
the local courts in amounts below 20 "dollours." Appeals for matters
above 40 "dollours" had to provide security and initiate the appeal within
six months." 6
The use of the appeal by the trading company emphasized the dele-
gation aspect of the appeal-that justice lay in the ability to seek redress
of decisions in a superior power. The appeal to the Pope and then to the
English ecclesiastical authorities had also emphasized this point. 17 With
the rise of the Stuarts, the appeal also began to be associated with the
king's supreme authority. James I explained the relationship between
king and judge in the infamous Star Chamber: "As Kings borrow their
power from God, so Judges from Kings: And as Kings are to account to
God, so Judges unto God and Kings."' And in Archeion, Lambarde
wrote:
115. Id. at 52-53 ("In what cases appeals are made"). See id. at 53-54 ("An act for decid-
ing of variance") (mentioning appeals in the course of advocating arbitration).
116. Id. at 52. The enactment of internal regulations required acceptance by the Lord
Chancellor, Lord Treasurer, and two Chief Justices. In 1616, the Privy Council decided to an-
nul some of the bylaws which led to the reissuing of the new Ordinances in 1617. Id. at xix.
The problem arose when the provincial courts on the coast (York, Newcastle, Hull, and Ips-
wich) complained about the lack of participation in the London Council's bylaws. The Privy
Council annulled 2 specific bylaws relating to trading and advised that an annual Court should
be held which representatives of the tows could attend without a vote. The 1616 Privy Council
order does not refer to the appeal provision, leading perhaps to the conclusion that the appeals
provision predated the 1617 reissue. Id. at Ixxi-lxxiii, 155-59 (discussing the Act of Privy
Council on Behalf of the Eastland Company, June 5, 1616). Appeals between 20 and 40
"dollours" were discouraged by requiring the party to give not only security but also 1/3 addi-
tional that was to be forfeited to the Company if the appeal was not "found to be just and
right." Id. at 52. Suits between members of the company were to be handled by arbitration
with each party binding themselves to accept the decision "without any appeal or further suite."
Id. at 53-54. In February 1624/25 the "Act of Appeals" was amended to provide that each per-
son had a month or 3 court days after the judgment to appeal and had to prosecute the appeal at
London within 6 months. Id. at 60. The "Orders and constitutions" of the Eastland Company
are remarkably similar to those of the East India Company, although the East India Company's
Orders do not contain an appeal provision. THE LAWES OR STANDING ORDERS OF THE EAST
INDIA COMPANY (1621).
117. See supra discussion accompanying notes 52-71.
118. King James I, A Speech in the Starre-Chamber, quoted in EUSDEN, supra note 35, at
59.
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Let no man in Suit appeal to the King, unless he may not get right at
home; but if that right be too heavy for him, go to the King to have it
eased. By which it may evidently appear, that even so many years ago
there might Appellation be made to the King's Person, whensoever the
Cause should enforce it. 
119
C. The Appeal of the Appeal
What appealed to the king should not have appealed to the Puritan
colonists. The Stuart theory of the divine right of kings and of the
"king's powers to remedy grievances" rapidly came under attack in the
early seventeenth century.'" The use of the prerogative court of Star
Chamber against Puritan opponents called into question the very exis-
tence of prerogative courts and their discretionary powers. The increas-
ing use of Chancery to rehear cases decided in common-law courts called
into question the legitimacy of a court without juries and the unbounded
discretion of the Chancellor. And the continued power of the ecclesiasti-
cal courts led Puritan reformers to criticize the courts as "relics of the
popish past" and led common-law courts to attempt to restrain the courts'
jurisdiction. 121
Yet these attacks on these courts did not translate into an attack on
the legitimacy of equity or the belief that justice should come from the
supreme authority in the Commonwealth. " Although Puritans disagreed
119. LAMBARDE, supra note 70, at 58. The companies often appealed to the King in
Council. Sellers, the editor of the Eastland Company Ordinances, notes that the men of York
and Hull appealed to the Council in 1625. See ACTS AND ORDINANCES, supra note 112, at
dxxi; see also BISSON, supra note 108, at 12-21 (discussing complaints of Merchant Adventur-
ers brought to the Privy Council).
120. TUDOR CONSTITUTION, supra note 46, at 163, 233-38. "[The notion of the king's
high court whose decisions overrode everything else precisely because it was the king's ultimate
seat of judgment, gave way before the developed idea of a representative institution-king-in-
Parliament (three partners in one body)-whose decisions bound everyone because everyone
was present in it as either in person or by proxy." Id. at 236.
121. INGRAM, CHURCH COURTS, supra note 58, at 4-5; VEALL, supra note 89, at 30-44;
EUSDEN, supra note 35, at 89-94. On Puritan law reform, see NANCY L. MATTHEWS,
WILLIAM SHEPPARD, CROMWELL'S LAW REFORMER (1984); DAVID SANDLER BERKOWITZ,
JOHN SELDEN'S FORMATIVE YEARS: POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN EARLY SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY ENGLAND 96-134 (1988); G.B. Warden, Law Reform in England and New England,
1620 to 1660, 35 WM. & MARY Q. 668-90 (3d ser. 1975). For a careful examination of the
relationship between the church courts and the Puritans, see Martin Ingram, Puritans and the
Church Courts, 1560-1640, in THE CULTURE OF ENGLISH PURITANISM, 1560-1700 58-91
(Christopher Durston & Jacqueline Eales eds., 1996).
122. The publication and republication of works addressing the jurisdictional hierarchy of
courts in the 1630s and 1640s attests to the fascination. Coke's Fourth Institutes was printed in
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with the origins of equity, they found the idea of equity essential to bring
man's "imperfect" laws into line with the "perfect and absolute" laws of
God."z Although they disagreed on the application of "conscience," it
remained a crucial concept in their vocabulary. 24 And although they
were concerned about the Stuart notion of a king-centered hierarchy, the
"conviction that there were ultimate authorities ruling through laws de-
termined the function and relationship of all institutions for Puritans and
lawyers. " 1
Perhaps most importantly, these attacks never became an attack on
the appeal, instead, the "appeal" became an increasingly powerful word
in popular culture. From the widely read political tracts to popular plays
by William Shakespeare, the "appeal" made its appearance. 26 The
popularizer of the perils of Puritanism, Richard Montagu, recalled Paul's
appeal in the title of his work defending the divine right of king: Appello
Caesarem: A Just Appeale from two Unjust Informers.27 The Puritan
1644, Lambarde's Archeion was printed in 1635, Crompton's Jurisdiction of Courts was re-
printed in 1647, and Thomas Smith's De republica Anglorum was reprinted in 1635. See
CROMARTIE, supra note 42, at 53.
123. William Perkins, EPIEKEIA, or a Treatise of Christian Equity and Moderation, in
PURITAN POLITICAL IDEAS 1558-1794 59, at 66-67 (Edmund S. Morgan, ed., 1965). For Per-
kins, the "practice of this equity, is the glory, credit, and honor" of assemblies and courts of
justice. Id. at 64. Perkins wrote, "If inferior judges or Magistrates [be] negligent herein, then
must we have recourse to the Prince, the highest Judge on earth, and under God the first Foun-
tain of Justice and mercy: whose care must [be], that as justice and mercy (not one of them, but
both together) [do] uphold his throne, & fasten the Crown upon his head." Id. at 66.
124. Waldo Beach, The Meaning and Authority of Conscience in Protestant Thought of
Seventeenth Century England (1944) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file
with author); DAVID LITTLE, RELIGION, ORDER AND LAW: A STUDY IN PRE-REVOLUTIONARY
ENGLAND 101-31 (1969); GEORGE L. MOSSE, THE HOLY PRETENCE: A STUDY OF
CHRISTIANITY AND REASON OF STATE FROM WILLIAM PERKINS TO JOHN WINTHROP 48-87
(1957); MARGO TODD, CHRISTIAN HUMANISM AND THE PURITAN SOCIAL ORDER 176 (1987).
125. EUSDEN, supra note 35, at 141. According to Eusden, the Puritans believed authority
had been distributed throughout society by God and fundamental laws and their concern was
primarily with keeping institutions within the bounds of "distributive authority." Id.
126. Shakespeare used the "appeal" in nine of his plays. Some of the Shakespeare refer-
ences to the appeal were found using MIT's The Works of William Shakespeare (visited July 1,
1996) <http://www.thetech.mit.edu/Shakespeare>.
127. RICHARD MONTAGU, APPELLO CAESAREM: A JUST APPEALE FROM TWO UNJUST
INFORMERS (1625). On Montagu, see WILLIAM HUNT, THE PURITAN MOMENT: THE COMING
OF REVOLUTION IN AN ENGLISH COUNTY 188-89 (1983); FRANCIS J. BREMER,
CONGREGATIONAL COMMUNION: CLERICAL FRIENDSHIP IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN PURITAN
COMMUNITY, 1610-1692 (1994); EUSDEN, supra note 35, at 78-82. Montagu's earlier work, A
Gagg for the New Gospell? No: A New Gagg for an Old Goose (1624), has often been credited
with popularizing the name "Puritan." Christopher Durston & Jacqueline Eales, "Introduction:
The Puritan Ethos, 1560-1700, " in THE CULTURE OF ENGLISH PURITANISM 1560-1700, at 1, 8
(Christopher Durston & Jacqueline Eales eds., 1996)
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John Yates' response to Montagu, Ibis ad Caesarem, "2 also embraced
the appeal. Yates addressed his pamphlet to the king: "The Supreme
and Sovereign Judge over all Causes and Appeals in his Majesty's Do-
minion. " 12' His title, Ibis ad Caesarem, quoted Festus' words to Paul:
"Hast thou appealed unto Caeser? Unto Caesar shalt thou go." 130 Yet
Yates also was eager to go before the king in this literary appeal. Para-
phrasing Paul, he wrote, "I think my self happy (o King) because I shall
answer this day before thee." 13' To both men, the appeal provided the
opportunity to bring all the facts before a new, higher authority. Even
Shakespeare chose the device of the appeal in a crucial scene in the play,
Henry VI, 132 which seemed an explicit comment on the reigns of Eliza-
beth and James I. In that scene, Shakespeare retold the story of Kather-
ine of Aragon's appeal to the Pope. To the king and Cardinal Wolsey,
Katherine states:
... that again
I do refuse you for my judge; and here,
Before you all, appeal unto the Pope,
To bring my whole cause 'fore his Holiness,
And to be judged by him.133
Like all appellants, Katherine knew the appeal would provide a re-
hearing of her "whole cause" before a judge whose authority she was
willing to accept. From Paul to the Puritans, the appeal permitted a sec-
ond chance to cry injustice.
II. The Culture of Appeal in Massachusetts and Rhode Island
The cultural power of the word "appeal" rippled into New England.
Even in colloquial references, the word "appeal" connoted the search for
justice by a rehearing before a higher authority. In 1632, the Company
of Husbandmen sought to resolve a monetary dispute by writing Massa-
chusetts Governor John Winthrop in an "appeal... for Justice."' 3 4 In





132. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY THE EIGHTH (1613).
133. Id. at act 2, sc. 4. The "appeal" appears twice more in Henry VIII. Id. at act 2, sc. 4
and act 5, sc. 1.
134. Letter from The Company of Husbandmen to John Winthrop (Dec. 1, 1632), in 3
WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, 101.
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1636, William Leigh wrote that he "appeale[d]" to the Governor's
brother as to the fact that he was a diligent preacher.135 In the spring of
1638, Roger Williams wrote John Winthrop that, with respect to their
disagreements, Williams desired "to rest in my Appeal to the most
high." 36 In an autumn 1638 treaty, Miantonomi and the Uncas pledged
not to seek revenge for injuries but "to appeal to the English" who were
"to decide." 37 In these references, the word "appeal" signaled the ac-
ceptance of authority-whether of God, the Governor, or the more ques-
tionable claim of the English-in return for the promise of a just decision.
Moreover, in each instance the appeal promised an investigation into the
facts and merits of the particular case. The power of this meaning of the
"appeal" persuaded the Puritan colonists to overlook the word's heritage
which embodied all that the Puritan colonists despised-Rome, the Angli-
can ecclesiastical system, the king-and accept the appeal which had
arisen out of colonial corporate practice.
A. The Corporate Practice of Appeal
By the 1640s, the appeal became a central component in the legal
system of Massachusetts Bay and Rhode Island. As previously noted,
two explanations exist for the peculiar colonial appearance of the appeal.
Roscoe Pound argued that the appeal was the result of crude colonial
practice.3 Julius Goebel argued that it was modeled on justice-of-the-
peace practice.13 ' Both theories implied that the colonial system of re-
dress had been based on low-level, common-law legal practices and in-
volved no substantive theory of justice.
Pound provided no evidence for his explanation and Goebel relied
on justice-of-the-peace statutes that were passed after the English Revo-
lution. In fact, Goebel's uncertainty about his own theory is apparent
throughout his argument. He wrote that the effect of the justice-of-the-
peace experience "had, we believe, much more to do with establishing in
135. Letter from William Leigh to John Winthrop (Sept. 20, 1636), in 3 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, 311, at 311.
136. 1 CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER WILLIAMS 149 (Glenn W. LaFantasie ed., 1988)
(Apr. 16, 1638).
137. ELISHA R. POTTER, THE EARLY HISTORY OF NARRAGANSETT 177 (Providence, Mar-
shall, Brown & Company 1835). See also 1 IRVING BERDINE RICHMAN, RHODE ISLAND: ITS
MAKING AND ITS MEANING 185 (1902); 1 CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note
136, at 187 n.l1.
138. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
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men's minds ideas about law enforcement and in particular about the
'right of appeal,' . . . than did the older forms of review.""4 Goebel did
not cite to any sixteenth or early seventeenth century justice-of-the-peace
manuals that used the phrase "appeal" for this procedure and, thus far, I
have been unable to find one.141 Although the word "appeal" was even-
tually attached to the statutes providing for the sessions procedure, the
earliest version of these statutes was passed between 1597 and 1601 and
did not use the word "appeal."142 Moreover, if the justice-of-the-peace
practice had been as well known as Goebel speculated, then the failure of
Rhode Island initially to adopt it is somewhat inexplicable. More likely,
the mid-seventeenth century use of the word "appeal" to describe these
procedures came from the larger cultural understandings of the appeal.
A more simple and persuasive explanation for the origin of the ap-
peal in America is that the culture of appeal passed to the colonists
through the corporate structure of the trading companies. The story of
Massachusetts' transition from company to colony is a familiar one: the
General Court of shareholders became the legislative body; the Governor
of the Company became the colonial leader; the Assistants became the
140. 1 GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 25 (emphasis added).
141. I have not located any justice-of-the-peace manual prior to the 1640s that uses the
word "appeal" to describe the procedure. The manuals are quite explicit on the use of writ of
error after judgment or certiorari for interlocutory moves to the central courts. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM LAMBARDE, EIRENARCHA: OR OF THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICES OF PEACE (1581);
MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTRY JUSTICE (1618 ed., 1619 ed., 1626 ed., 1635 ed.). Indeed,
Goebel acknowledged in a footnote that the "term 'appeal' in the statutes begins after the Resto-
ration." 1 GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 24-25 n.73. The
Webbs' discussion of appeal to the Court of Quarter Sessions, cited by Goebel, describes the
"early years of the eighteenth century." SYDNEY & BEATRICE WEBB, THE PARISH AND THE
COUNTY 420 (Frank Cass & Co., Ltd. 1963) (1906).
142. By the eighteenth century, the procedure was termed an "appeal." JOSEPH SHAW,
PARISH LAw 168-69 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. ed., 1991) (6th ed. 1748). Before the Elizabe-
than statutes, there was no right of appeal. "The remedy, in so far as one was available, was to
have the proceedings reviewed by the prerogative writ or to have the justices tried and punished
for misconduct." 1 THOMAS SKYRME, HISTORY OF THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE 138 (1991).
Skyrme views the Elizabethan statutes as the earliest possible right of appeal to the Quarter Ses-
sions. However, as noted above, neither statute contained the word "appeal." An Act for the
Relief of the Poor, 1597, 39 Eliz. ch. 3; Who Shall Be Overseers of the Poor, 1601, 43 Eliz.
ch. 2. Skyrme notes that it was not until 1907 that "an effective system of appeal" was intro-
duced. SKYMRE, supra. On justices-of-the-peace, see J.H. GLEASON, THE JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE IN ENGLAND, 1558-1640 (1969); E.G. DOWDELL, A HUNDRED YEARS OF QUARTER
SESSIONS: THE GOVERNMENT OF MIDDLESEX FROM 1660 TO 1760 (Harold Dexter Hazeltine
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1932); CHARLES BEARD, THE OFFICE OF THE JUSTICE OF THE
PEACE IN ENGLAND IN ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT (1904).
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Council; the freemen became the citizens.143 To this list, one should add
that the appeal within the company became an appeal within the coun-
try.
144
Within the Massachusetts' Company, the appeal most likely became
known through the Virginia Council, although perhaps via London in-
stead of Jamestown. In 1619 and 1620, the Council for Virginia in Eng-
land published a small pamphlet entitled Orders and Constitutions45
which, like the Eastland Merchants' Acts and Ordinances (1617), de-
scribed the company's internal regulations. Within these ordinances
"partly collected" from the patents, "partly ordained by mature delibera-
tion," the Virginia Council included chapter 88 on appeals:
The particular Members of the Company shall be subject to the general
Courts, in matters concerning the Company or Plantation. If any man
find himself aggrieved by a lesser or ordinary Court, he may appeal to
a great and Quarter-Court, where the matter shall be heard and finally
ordered. If any man refuse to obey both the one Court and other, he
shall be disfranchised.146
143. 1 ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 430-61.
144. The corporate form remained important for a long time in colonial complaints. For
example, Patrick Copeland's letter to John Winthrop noted that the Company was "inclinable to
hear our complaints and to right us in the wrongs we have sustained by our Governor, Counsel
and Assembly here." Letter from Patrick Copeland to John Winthrop (Sept. 1647), in 5
WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, 182, at 183. Thus Copeland and others had decided to see
"what redress they might have by Company; but if Company right us not, they write they in-
tended to spread our Complaints before higher powers [Parliament]." Id. at 183.
145. Orders and Constitutions, Partly collected out of his Majesties Letters Patents, and
partly ordained upon mature deliberation, by the Treasuror, Counseil and Companie of Vir-
ginia, for the better governing of the Actions and affaires of the said Companie here in England
residing. Anno 1619 and 1620 [hereinafter Orders and Constitutions], in 3 TRACTS AND
OTHER PAPERS RELATING PRINCIPALLY TO THE ORIGIN, SETTLEMENT AND PROGRESS OF THE
COLONIES IN NORTH AMERICA (Peter Force ed., Peter Smith pub. 1947). [hereinafter TRACTS
AND OTHER PAPERS]. The Orders were appended to A declaration of the state of the colonie
and affaires in Virginia, reprinted in 3 TRACTS AND OTHER PAPERS, supra. The Orders are
reprinted in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY OF LONDON 340-65 (Susan Myra
Kingsbury ed., 1906) [hereinafter RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY].
146. Orders and Constitutions, supra note 145; 3 RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY,
supra note 145, at 307. The pre-1620 laws do not appear to include appeals. 3 RECORDS OF
THE VIRGINIA COMPANY, supra, at 158-77 (recording actions during July-Aug. 1619); FOR THE
COLONY IN VIRGINEA BRITANNIA LAWES DIVINE, MORALL AND MARTIALL, ETC. (David H.
Flaherty ed., Univ. Press of Virginia 1969) (1612); David Thomas Konig, 'Dale's Laws' and
the Non-Common Law Origins of Criminal Justice in Virginia, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 354-75
(1982). The 1619 "complaint in nature of an appeal" found throughout the Virginia Records
was a typical use of the appeal within the martial courts to address a jurisdictional issue: the
"question whether Marshall law be a justificable proceedings." 1 RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA
COMPANY OF LONDON, supra, at 217, 219, 222, 226, 230 (discussing Brewster v. Argoll).
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In 1624, the Virginia colony further adopted the corporate under-
standing of the appeal as a method of delegation when it established
monthly courts "in the corporations of Charles City and Elizabeth
City... with reservation of appeal" to the governor and council. 47
Massachusetts' appeal procedure appears to have been modeled on
the Virginia Council's corporate appeal procedure. Lawmakers in Mas-
sachusetts were aware of Virginia law. In March 1633, Edward Howe
sent John Winthrop Jr. a "book of the Laws established for Virginia" to
present to his father. 48 Several years later in April 1636, Governor
Winthrop wrote his son that the General Court had recently ordained
"quarterly Courts" and "4 Courts in the year at Boston for greater
Causes, and for Appeals. "149 The March 1636 legislation provided, "if
any persons shall find himself grieved with the sentence of any of the said
Courts, he may appeal to the next great Quarter Court.""'0 The similarity
Andrews suggests that the Orders and Constitutions were not sent over until 1621 with Gover-
nor Wyatt. 1 ANDREWS, supra note 7, at 187. However, in February 1620, references to laws
of the company being 120 in number in 18 chapters appears in the records. The Orders had 18
chapters and have headings identical to those discussed. 1 RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA
COMPANY, supra, at 301-4 (recording actions taken on Feb. 2, 1620).
147. 4 RECORDS OF THE VIRGINIA COMPANY, supra note 145, at 582. On early seven-
teenth century Virginia law, see Warren M. Billings, The Transfer of English Law to Virginia
1606-50, in THE WESTWARD ENTERPRISE, ENGLISH ACTnvmEs IN IRELAND, THE ATLANTIC,
AND AMERICA, 1480-1650: ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO DAVID BEERS QUINN 215-244 (K.R. An-
drews et al. eds., 1978); David Thomas Konig, Colonization and the Common Law in Ireland
and Virginia, 1569-1634, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 70-92
(James A. Henretta et al. eds., 1991). Virginia lies outside of the scope of my larger project;
however, a cursory look at these sources on Virginia in the early seventeenth century suggests
that the meanings of appeal were similar to those found in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.
148. Letter from Edward Howes to John Winthrop, Jr. (Mar. 18, 1632/33), in 3
WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, at 111. The editor of the Winthrop Papers has suggested that
Howe's book "was a manuscript copy of the revision of the laws adopted by the General As-
sembly in September, 1632." Letter from Edward Howes to John Winthrop, Jr. (Mar. 25,
1633), in 3 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra, 114, at 115 n.2. However, the editor cites no addi-
tional proof for the theory. See id.
149. Letter from John Winthrop to John Winthrop, Jr. (Apr. 26, 1636), in 3 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 255 (noting the establishment of these courts in March 1636). The
impetus for the appeal may have been the meeting among Cotton, Winthrop, Dudley and Vane
at which Haynes suggested that Winthrop "dealt too remissly in point of justice." 1 JOHN
WINTHROP, WINTHROP'S JOURNAL: HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND 1, 169-72 (Jan. 18, 1635/36)
(James Kendall Hosmer ed., 1908) [hereinafter WINTHROP, JOURNAL]. The leaders concluded
among other articles that "trivial things, etc., should be ended in towns." Id.
150. 1 RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW
ENGLAND, 169 (Nathaniel B. Shurtleff ed., 1835) (documenting legislation enacted Mar. 3,
1635/36) [hereinafter MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS]. In March 1636, Massachusetts Bay set up
four courts in which magistrates or "other persons of worth" would try small "civil causes" and
criminal causes which did not involve the loss of life, member, or banishment. Id. If the party
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between the Massachusetts appeals procedure and the Council's Orders
and Constitutions may suggest that the Howe volume might have been a
copy of the Council's published orders. Like the appeal procedure used
by the Eastland Merchants, the Massachusetts appeal structured the dele-
gation of judicial power to lower courts in towns.
After 1636, the appeal repeatedly appeared in Massachusetts legisla-
tion as a method to delegate this judicial power. In September 1638, the
court passed an act to end "small causes" by permitting a magistrate or
two men to hear and determine small matters with the exception that "if
any of the parties shall find themselves grieved with any such end or
sentence, they may appeal to the next Quarter Court, or Courts of Assis-
tants, etc."' When the court deputized the towns to take land for high-
ways, it authorized an appeal.' When it granted William Pynchon a
commission to hear cases at Springfield, it also authorized an appeal to
the Court of Assistants.'53 And when it created quarter courts in Ipswich
and Salem, it once again authorized an appeal. 5
Indeed, the appeal remained even when the corporate origins of the
law began to disappear. In John Cotton's draft of Moses his Judicialls,
Cotton included appeals from the town courts to the Court of Governor
and Assistants and then to the General Court."5 The governor and coun-
sellors were to "direct in all matters, wherein Appeal is made to them
from inferior Courts."5 6 Cotton justified the appeal as "agreeable with
was "grieved with the sentence" he could "appeal" to the next great quarter court so long as he
abided that sentence. Id. Anyone who brought an appeal without "just cause" was to "be ex-
emplarily punished." Id. The 1636 Plymouth laws provided for courts and trials, but neither
the appeal nor any other mechanism for redress were provided; appeals appeared in 1645. THE
COMPACT WITH THE CHARTER AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH 79 (Williams
Hein Co. 1986) (1836); George Haskins, The Legal Heritage of Plymouth Colony, in ESSAYS IN
THE HISTORY OF EARLY AMERICAN LAW, supra note 24, at 121-46.
151. 1 MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS, supra note 150, at 239 (documenting court actions on
Sept. 6, 1638).
152. See id. at 280 (documenting court actions on Nov. 5, 1639).
153. See id. at 321-22 (documenting court actions on June 2, 1641). On Pynchon, see
COLONIAL JUSTICE IN WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS, 1639-1702 (Joseph H. Smith ed., 1961)
(incorporating Pynchon's diary of judicial proceedings in the Springfield courts).
154. See 1 MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS, supra note 150, at 325-26 (documenting court ac-
tions on June 2, 1641).
155. JOHN COTTON, AN ABSTRACT OF THE LAwES OF NEW ENGLAND, AS THEY ARE Now
ESTABLISHED 2 (London 1655) [hereinafter COTTON, AN ABSTRACT]. On Cotton's laws, see
C. Worthington Ford, Cotton's 'Moses his Judidalls" in 16 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 274-80 (2d ser. 1902).
156. COTTON, AN ABSTRACT, supra note 155, at 1. Cotton included a number of provi-
sions on appeals. One stated that the Governor and Council could hear all cases brought to
them but reserved "liberty of Appeal from him to the general Court." Id. at 2. The towns also
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the word of God"" 7 by simply citing scriptural texts from Exodus and
Deuteronomy."18 His choice of references was not original. In a 1618
English pamphlet, Nathaniel Ward had cited his brother's use of the same
Biblical passages as a reminder to Chancellor Francis Bacon that Chan-
cery should "elect, direct and correct inferiour Magistracy." 5 9 By 1641,
Ward was in Massachusetts, and references to the Mosaic law had be-
come contested. Thus, Ward's scribal edition of Massachusetts laws, the
Body of Liberties, included the liberty of appeal and this time suggested it
was equally compatible with "humanity, civility and Christianity.""16 By
1648, the appeal was an accepted part of Massachusetts law. The col-
ony's first printed code, the Laws and Liberties, contained an entire title,
"Appeal." 16' The law permitted appeals to the Court of Assistants and a
could hear cases of "less value" but reserved "liberty of Appeal to the Court of Governor and
Assistants." Id. The law stated that there should be liberty of Appeal from the Governor to the
General Court and "from an Inferiour Court to an Higher Court." Id. This was matched by a
statement that the General Court could hear and determine all causes "wherein appeal shall be
made unto them, or which they shall see cause to assume." Id. at 3.
157. In May 1636, the Court appointed a committee including Cotton to "make a draught of
lawes agreeable to the word of God" in the meantime the magistrates were to "hear & deter-
mine all causes according to the laws now established, & where there is no law, then as near the
law of God as they can," 1 MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS, supra note 150, at 175 (documenting
court actions on May 25, 1636).
158. COTTON, AN ABSTRACT, supra note 155, at 2. Exodus 18:22 is drawn from a discus-
sion between Jethro and Moses. Jethro told Moses: "And let them judge the people at all sea-
sons: and it shall be, that every hard matter they shall being unto thee, but every small matter
they shall judge themselve[s]: so make it lighter for thee, and they shall bear the burden with
thee." Exodus 18:22. Deuteronomy involved the words of Moses: "If there rise a matter too
hard for thee in judgment between blood and blood, between plea and plea... [in] matters of
controversy within thy gate" then go to "the Priests and the Levites and they shall shew thee the
sentence." Deuteronomy 17:8, 17:9. Deuteronomy 1:17 and 1:18 are similar.
159. SAMUEL WARD, JETHRO'S JUSTICE OF PEACE 4 (London, Edward Griffin 1618).
Nathaniel Ward wrote the introduction to his brother Samuel Ward's sermon, Jethro's Justice of
Peace. The Wards' connection to the Jethro sermon suggests that the dichotomy between Cot-
ton's and Ward's approach may not have been as great as has been suggested. On Cotton and
Ward, see BOZEMAN, supra note 8, at 174-82. The 1635 edition of Lambarde's Archeion also
referred to Jethro's ideas of the judiciary. LAMBARDE, supra note 70, at 11. On Mosaic law,
see Keith Thomas, The Puritans and Adultery: The Act of 1650 Reconsidered, in PURITANS AND
REVOLUTIONARIES: ESSAYS IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY HISTORY 257-82 (Donald Pennington
& Keith Thomas eds., 1978).
160. WILLIAM H. WHITMORE, THE COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS CONTAINING
ALSO, THE BODY OF LIBERTIES OF 1641, at 41 (1889). The relevant provision stated: It shall
be in the liberty of every man cast condemned or sentenced in any cause in any Inferior Court,
to make their Appeal to the Court of Assistants ... And every man shall have liberty to com-
plain to the General Court of any Injustice done to him in any Court of Assistants or other."
Id. The Body of Liberties was never printed.
161. MAX FARRAND, THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF MASSACHUSETTS (1929).
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jury if the appeal involved a matter of fact. 62 Into the 1660s, long after
Massachusetts had abandoned its outward commitment to the corporate
form, the appeal with its broad possibility of rehearings remained central
to the judicial system."
The corporate origin of the appeal explains the initial absence of ap-
peals in Rhode Island. This absence did not arise from lack of legal
knowledge about the corporation. Roger Williams knew that corpora-
tions had courts. Williams noted that "a Corporation, Society, or Com-
pany of East-Indie or Turkie-Merchants, or any other Society or Com-
pany in London . . may hold their Courts, keep their Records, hold
disputations; and in matters concerning their Society, may dissent, di-
vide, break into Schisms and Factions, sue and implead each other at
Law. " " The communities of Rhode Island, however, were not corpora-
tions. As Williams noted, they had "no Patent." 1" Thus, they had no
appeals.
Nevertheless, the appeal began to appear in Rhode Island. The first
mention of the appeal appears in 1640 when Portsmouth and Newport
merged.'6 The appeal solved the problem of delegating authority be-
tween each town's courts and the new unified court structure. From the
town courts, the new law authorized "appeal to the Quarter Sessions"
162. Id. at 2. Cotton's letter to Winthrop on the draft of the 1648 laws also suggests that
Cotton's laws and the 1648 laws were not as dissimilar as they appear. Letter from John Cot-
ton to John Winthrop (c. 1648), in 5 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, 196, at 192-94. Cot-
ton's suggestions to Winthrop on the fundamental nature of the laws of God were incorporated
almost verbatim into the 1648 introduction. Compare id. to FARRAND, supra note 161.
163. The 1660 edition of the laws under "Appeal" clarified that in capital offences there
could be an appeal to the General Court, required the appellant to submit the reasons for the
appeal in writing, and limited the court to "former evidence." 1 THE LAWS AND LIBERTIES OF
MASSACHUSETTS, 1641-1691, at 72 (John D. Cushing comp. 1976). Given that juries were
provided for appeals of fact, the "former evidence" may have involved not raising new evi-
dence rather than deciding on a prior record. Moreover, there appears to be no presumption
that the first court is the more appropriate fact-finder. The provision states that the court should
"rectify[] what is amiss therein, and where matter of fact is found to agree with the former
Court, and the judgment according to Law not to revoke the sentence or judgment, but to abate
or increase damages." Id.
164. Roger Williams, The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution, in 1 PUBLICATIONS OF THE
NARRAGANSETT CLUB, 70, 73 (Samuel L. Caldwell ed., Providence 1867) [hereinafter Wil-
liams, Bloudy Tenent].
165. 1 CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note 136, at 53 (Aug. 25, 1636).
Williams' views on patents were somewhat cynical; he had noted earlier that patents were not
drawn at the bequest of the government but "by some Counsellor at Law whom the Patentees
employs." 3 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, at 146-49 (Jan. 3, 1633/34).
166. 1 RHODE ISLAND RECORDS, supra note 103, at 106-7 (Aug. 6, 1640).
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courts consisting of magistrates and a jury. 7 In 1647, Roger Williams
communicated instructions to the Providence committee on a new colonial
government that stated there should be "an exact and orderly way open
for appeals unto General Courts, that so, if any shall be justly grieved, at
any sentence passed, or otherwise, he or they may make their lawful
charge for relief there. 6 Although the 1647 laws do not appear to have
included appeals,' 69 by 1651, the colony had passed legislation permitting
an appeal from the town courts to the General Court of Trials. ° As in
Massachusetts, the appeal permitted a rehearing of the case. The General
Court of Trials consisted of an assistant from each of the four towns, the
town magistrates from the town in which the Court sat, and a jury.'7'
Despite almost annual legislative changes to the court system during the
1650s, the appeal remained in Rhode Island law; indeed, the 1664 legis-
lation provided that "any one of the Assistants may grant an appeal upon
substantial matter, error, or attaint, the cost of Court being paid."" In
167. Id. at 106.
168. To the General Court Delegates of Providence (ca. May 16, 1647), in 1 WILLIAMS,
CORRESPONDENCE, supra note 136, 229, at 230.
169. 1 RHODE ISLAND RECORDS, supra note 103, at 143-146 (May 18, 1647). Coggeshall
wrote Winthrop Jr. that there had been a general agreement (beyond expectation) and the "laws
of England were established with very little variation." Letter from John Coggeshall to John
Winthrop, Jr. (May 24, 1647), in 5 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, 165 at 166. Coggeshall
noted that two acts were changed that next day because of dissatisfaction. Id. The 1647 laws
were never published. New acts were simply circulated in manuscript to the towns. Indeed,
even the 1705 compilation remained in manuscript form. THE EARLIEST ACTS AND LAWS OF
THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, 1647-1719 vii-ix (John D.
Cushing ed., 1979). Most legal historians and historians have assumed that the laws appearing
in Bartlett's edition of the Rhode Island Records were passed in 1647. See G.B. Warden, The
Rhode Island Civil Code of 1647, in SAINTS & REVOLUTIONARIES: ESSAYS ON EARLY
AMERICAN HISTORY 142-149 (David D. Hall et al. eds., 1984). The placement of the laws in
the manuscript volume, however, appears to follow records for 1665. Id. at 144 n.9. My cur-
rent research is investigating the possibility that these laws may have been a 1660s compilation.
170. 1 RHODE ISLAND RECORDS, supra note 103, at 237 (1651).
171. Id. at 191-92, 203; see, eg., 1 RHODE ISLAND COURT RECORDS: RECORDS OF THE
GENERAL COURT OF TRIALS OF THE COLONY OF PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS, 1647-1662, at 14
(1920) (listing town magistrates) [hereinafter RHODE ISLAND COURT RECORDS].
172. 2 RHODE ISLAND RECORDS, supra note 103, at 31 (March 1663/64). The legislation
during the 1650s suggests that some efforts were being made to attempt to limit the number of
rehearings. The legislation is somewhat confusing because it is not clear which acts were re-
pealed. In 1650, an act stated that there would be no rehearings unless upon a substantial mat-
ter, error, or attaint. 1 RHODE ISLAND RECORDS, supra, at 222 (May 23, 1650). In 1651, a
new act provided for an appeal to the General Court or review in the same Court. Id. at 237
(1651). In 1652, another act continued the appeal in the General Court but limited it to evi-
dence given in the town court. Id. at 242 (May 18, 1652). In 1657, the colony limited rehear-
ings after judgment to one. Id. at 357 (May 19, 1657); see 1 CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER
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1663, Rhode Island became the first colony to include in its new charter a
provision expressly permitting the Governor and Company to appeal to
England in matters of "public controversy" between Rhode Island and
other colonies. 173
B. The Meaning of Appeal: Equity and Conscience
Although the corporate origins meant that the two colonies adopted
the appeal at different moments, the meanings that had surrounded the
culture of appeal in England were understood and shared by the colonists
of Massachusetts Bay and Rhode Island. Colloquial references to the ap-
peal demonstrate that the colonists associated the "appeal" with a request
for broad equitable justice. Thus William Piggott made an "appeal" to
Winthrop "not doubting but to receive ample satisfaction" to rescue his
son from an abusive indentureship.1 74 They also associated the appeal
with conscience; indeed, the words seemed to them to belong together.
Thomas Larkham "appeale[d] with a good conscience" to God in a mat-
ter of religious dispute.' 75 John Cotton stated that he would "appeal to
Mr. Williams his own Conscience" if it were "not [l]eavened with over-
deep prejudice." 76 Williams dared to "appeal to Master Cotton's con-
WILLIAMS, supra note 136, at 233. On at least two occasions during the 1650s, the Providence
town records referred to appeals. 2 THE EARLY RECORDS OF THE TOWN OF PROVIDENCE 60,
91 (Providence 1893).
173. 2 RHODE ISLAND RECORDS, supra note 103, at 20 (July 8, 1663). The language
seems to imply that anyone from Rhode Island could appeal in a dispute with other colonies, not
just the colony itself.
[I]n all matters of public controversy which may fall out between our Colony of Provi-
dence Plantations, and the rest of our Colonies in New-England, it shall and may be law-
ful to and for the Governor and Company of the said Colony of Providence Planations to
make their appeals therein to us, our heirs and successors, for redress in such cases,
within this our realm of England.
Id. The next phrase gave the Rhode Islanders right of passage through the other New England
colonies. Id.
174. Letter from William Piggott to John Winthrop (May 4, 1647), in 5 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, 154, at 155 (May 4, 1647).
175. Letter from Thomas Larkham to John Winthrop (Feb. 1640/41), in 4 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, 317, at 319.
176. John Cotton, A Reply To Mr. Williams his Examination, in 2 PUBLICATIONS OF THE
NARRAGANSETr CLUB supra note 164, 9, at 31 [hereinafter Cotton, Reply]; see id. at 60 ("ap-
peal even unto the conscience of Mr. Williams himself").
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science"" and, in his Address to the General Court of New England, he
made an "appeal to the consciences of God's most knowing Servants.
" 171
The colonists repeatedly confirmed their belief in the importance of
equity in deciding controversial causes. Sir Henry Vane offered to give
John Winthrop, Jr. his advice to settle a matter "according to the Justice
and Equity of the cause. , 179 John Cotton complained that Samuel Gorton
had refused to "shew the right, and equity" of his cause"'0 and, with re-
gard to Roger Williams' forced removal from Massachusetts, declared
the "equity of his Banishment.""' Roger Williams was no different. He
noted that some of Cotton's accusations had a "want of Equity." 8  Wil-
liams even explicitly condoned the equity of chancery courts: "if men
see cause to ordain a Court of Chancery, and erect a Mercy-seat to mod-
erate the rigor of Laws, which cannot be justly executed, without the
moderate and equal consideration of persons and other circumstances!'183
Indeed, other colonists thought equity was the point of the justice system.
In an account of a trial, Samuel Symonds noted that after the "rest was
pleaded, ... point of Chancery or equity was pleaded." 4 And Edward
Parks described a trial against a Mr. Cooke, whose "[firiends carried it
177. Roger Williams, The Bloody Tenent Yet More Bloody in 4 PUBLICATIONS OF THE
NARRAGANSETT CLUB, supra note 164, 21, at 98 [hereinafter Williams, More Bloody].
178. Id. at 29.
179. Letter from Sir Henry Vane to John Winthrop, Jr. (July 1, 1636), in 3 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, 282, at 282.
180. Cotton, Reply, supra note 176, at 16.
181. Id. at 67. Cotton even linked the appeal to equity in discussing a biblical passage on
obeying priests: the "law is of moral equity, that is of universal and perpetual equity, in all Na-
tions, in all Ages: He that shall presumptuously appeal from, or rise up against the sentence of
the chiefest and highest Court in a free State, is guilty." Id. at 69. Williams later responded to
this idea by suggesting that it was implausible that all the nations of the world should be ruled
by Christian laws. Williams, More Bloody, supra note 177, at 322. According to Willimas,
Cotton believed that the laws that survived were those of "common Equity." Id. at 485. Wil-
liams quoted Cotton's A Model of Church and Civil Power, where he stated that the Magistrates
should apply the laws as are "expressed in the Word of God in Moses Judicialls (to wit, so far
as they are of general and moral equity, and so binding all Nations in all Ages)." Williams,
Bloudy Tenent, supra note 164, at 254. Bozeman associates the use of equity with the Bible.
BOZEMAN, supra note 8, at 160-87. Although English Puritan political and religious writers
used "equity" in conjunction with discussion of Mosaic law, this use may be the application of
larger ideas of equity to Scripture, rather than an indigenous scriptural use.
182. Williams, More Bloody, supra note 177, at 466.
183. Id. at 486.
184. Letter from Samuel Symonds to John Winthrop, Jr. (Oct. 6, 1647), in 5 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, 185, at 187 (1647).
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against justice and equity."185 Moreover, both colonies' judicial systems
possessed procedural characteristics that reinforced the importance of eq-
uity. The colonial court systems did not separate equity courts like
Chancery from common law courts. Rhode Island's General Court of
Trials heard cases without distinction. 186 In Massachusetts, as Thomas
Lechford noted in Plain Dealing (1642), the general and quarter courts
had the "power of Parliament, Kings Bench, Common Pleas, Chancery,
High Commission and Star-chamber, and all other Courts of England."187
Both colonies made this promise of equity a reality by allowing re-
hearings before superior authorities. In Rhode Island, although no "ap-
peal" initially existed, both the arbitral system in Providence and Judge-
and-Elder structure in Pocasset guaranteed rehearings by a larger section
of the community. In Providence, a document signed by a large section
of the community, apparently including two women, ensured that a party
who disagreed with the decision of the five arbitral "desposers" could
have the clerk call "the Town together ... for a Trial." 88 In Pocasset,
"the Judge and Elders" had to report to the Assembly of freemen of the
town, every three months, "all such cases, actions and Rules which have
passed through their hands, by them, to be scanned and weighed by the
word of Christ." 8 9 If "the Lord" had "dispense[d] light to the contrary
of what by the Judge and Elders hath been determined formerly; that then
and there it [should] be repealed.""
In Massachusetts, the infamous case of Goody Sherman's sow,
Sherman v. Keayne, 19' demonstrates the broad acceptance of rehearings.
185. Letter from Edward Parks to John Winthrop (Apr. 28, 1647), in 5 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, 151, at 151.
186. See 1 RHODE ISLAND COURT RECORDS, supra note 171.
187. THOMAS LECHFORD, PLAIN DEALING OR NEwS FROM NEW ENGLAND 63 (J.
Hammond Trumbull ed., J.K. Wiggin & Win. Parsons Lunt 1867) (1642). Richard Vines
wrote Winthrop from Saco explaining that they had "a mixt court, consisting of chancery and
common law both." Letter from Richard Vines to John Winthrop (Dec. 1, 1643), in 4
WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, 420, at 421.
188. 1 HOWARD M. CHAPIN, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF RHODE ISLAND 113 (1916). In
Providence, a system of arbitration was adopted because "the face of Magistracy" did not "suit
with our present condition." Letter from Roger Williams to John Winthrop (c. Sept. 1636), in
3 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, 296, at 296.
189. CHAPIN, supra note 188, at 48-49.
190. 1 RHODE ISLAND RECORDS, supra note 103, at 64 (Nov. 2, 1638).
191. John Winthrop's Summary of the Case Between Richard Sherman and Robert Keayne
(July 15, 1642), in 4 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, 349 at 349-52. The case of Goody
Sherman's sow is conventionally held to be responsible for the separation of the magistrates and
deputies in the Massachusetts General Assembly. On Sherman v. Keayne, see Mark DeWolfe
Howe & Louis F. EatonJr,. The Supreme Judicial Power in the Colony of Massachuseus Bay,
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When Sherman's case reached the General Court on petition, the General
Court completely reheard the case over a seven-day period. 2 After this
hearing, Winthrop even suggested that the case could be once again rear-
gued.1" Indeed, the theory behind the suggestion of rehearing demon-
strates the wide-spread belief in the importance of equity and the particu-
lar circumstances of the parties. Winthrop notes in his journal that many
people wanted the case to be reheard because the defendant "being a rich
man, and she a poor woman, this so wrought with the people." 194 Win-
throp thought these feelings to be "unreasonable compassion;" nonethe-
less, he noted that despite the uncertain result, the General Court decided
to try and persuade Keayne to restore whatever money he had obtained
from Sherman.'95
On appeal, both colonial systems ensured that the rehearing would
be on the facts by usually requiring the presence of a jury on appeal. In
Massachusetts, the 1648 Laws and Liberties required that a jury be pres-
ent in an appeal to the Court of Assistants if the appeal be in matter of
fact. 9  Similarly, it appears that Rhode Island's General Court of Trials
always provided for a jury.1" The appeal's association with this common
acceptance of equity on rehearing strengthened its presence in the colo-
nial judicial systems.
C. The Meaning of Appeal: Authority
The acceptance of the culture of appeal in New England allowed the
appeal to become the central motif of numerous debates over the location
of authority. In seventeenth century New England, no question was more
difficult than one involving authority. Avi Soifer writes, "[i]ntrigue and
20 NEW ENG. Q. 291 (1947); Black, The Judicial Power, supra note 11, at 269-346; Black,
The Concept of a Supreme Court, supra note 11, at 43-79
192. John Winthrop's Summary of the Case Between Richard Sherman and Robert Keayne
(July 15, 1642), in 4 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, at 351.
193. Id.
194. 2 WINTHROP, JOURNAL, supra note 149, at 118-19.
195. Id. at 64-66. If Sherman had brought an appeal from the county court under the law,
it would have gone, as Winthrop noted, to "the Court of Assistants to which it properly be-
longed." John Winthrop's Summary of the Case Between Richard Sherman and Robert Keayne
(July 15, 1642) in 4 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, at 349-50. Yet no one appears to have
objected to the absence of proper procedure or two-year delay. Winthrop also suggested that
the case could have been sent to committee to decide. Id. at 352.
196. See FARRAND, supra note 161, at 2. On juries, see Letter from William Pynchon to
John Winthrop (Mar. 9, 1646/47), in 5 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, 135.
197. See THE EARLY RECORDS OF THE TOWN OF WARWICK (1926); RHODE ISLAND
COURT RECORDS, supra note 171.
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ceaseless disputation about what gave anyone legitimate authority to claim
to be in charge pervaded life among the first colonists in Virginia and
New England .... Sovereignty always was uncertain."' 98 Yet rejecting
or restructuring authority was not without its hazards and could lead to
imprisonment or even death. Moreover, "authority" was often hard to
recognize and, therefore, sometimes even harder to reject. The appeal
mediated these difficulties. Unlike the writ of error with its static insis-
tence on the authority of the court, the appeal engaged the litigant in the
acceptance of superior authority. The appeal represented an exchange
wherein the litigant promised to recognize authority in return for the case
being reheard. Authority was constructed at the moment of the appeal.
Thus by talking about the appeal, the colonists could safely discuss their
understanding of the location of supreme authority.
The New England colonists knew that the culture of appeal carried
with it the belief that justice lay in a series of hierarchically-arranged su-
perior powers, so it is not surprising that they used the word to convey
their recognition of a superior authority. In the spiritual realm, where the
supreme authority was relatively uncontroversial-God-they appealed to
God. Roger Williams "appeale[d] to the Searcher of all Hearts.""9
Samuel Gorton also "appeale[d] unto God the searcher of hearts" and he
"appeale[d] unto God the judge of all secrets."' On occasion, they used
the appeal to designate God's delegated authority. John Winthrop, for
example, thought seven members a better number to constitute a church
congregation because "an appeal was allowed from three.""' And some-
times, they even used the appeal to worry about the relationship between
church and God. Winthrop noted that if "the Church should become the
supreme Court in the Jurisdiction, and capable of all Appeals," then it
would be exalted above God.('
In the 1630s when the location of supreme political authority-Mas-
sachusetts Bay-also appeared relatively uncontroversial to many colo-
nists, the appeal was often absent or only hesitatingly asserted. In 1636,
198. AVIAM SOIFER, LAW AND THE COMPANY WE KEEP 7,24 (1995).
199. Williams, More Bloody, supra note 177, at 465.
200. Samuel Gorton, Samuel Gorton's Letter to Nathaniel Morton, Warwick (June 30,
1669), in 4 TRACTS AND OTHER PAPERS, supra note 145, at 9, 11.
201. 1 WINTHROP, JOURNAL, supra note 149, at 173 (Feb. 1, 1636).
202. John Winthrop's Essay Against the Power of the Church to Sit in Judgment on the
Civil Magistracy (c. Nov. 1637), in 3 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, 505, at 505.
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even the banished Roger Williams did not appeal to England.' A few
were less agreeable. Edward Winslow warned Winthrop from New Ply-
mouth that if "new England will afford no Justice," he would "appeal
further."' However, even one who actually asserted the appeal did so
with an ambivalent attitude. In 1637, when John Wheelwright appealed
to the "king's court" after the judgment, Wheelwright did not "desire[]
any act to be made of it."' When the court told him that "an appeal did
not lie; for by the king's grant we had power to hear and determine with-
out any reservation," Wheelwright quietly "relinquished his appeal."'
With the onset of the English Revolution, however, the issue of who
held supreme authority was no longer so quietly accepted. Roger Wil-
liams noted that "in this present storm of England's sorrows, one of the
greatest Queries in all the Kingdom [is] who are the true Officers, true
Commanders, true Justices, true Commissioners."' As Williams'
"true" suggested, authority was a slippery idea. In England, as John
Winthrop learned, "books entitled Appeals to the people are put forth by
Lilburne and others" to persuade "the people that all power and sover-
eignty is devolved and came back to its first subject, viz: themselves."208
Like Lilburne, the American colonists employed the legal meaning of the
appeal as a literary device to signal the rejection or acceptance of author-
203. 1 WINTHROP, JOURNAL, supra note 149, at 162-63; 1 CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER
WILLIAMS, supra note 136, at 21-22. Ironically, the Massachusetts Bay colony actually
planned to send Williams to England. 1 WINTHROP, JOURNAL, supra, at 168.
204. Letter from Edward Winslow to John Winthrop, Jr. (June 22, 1636), in 3 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 274.
205. 1 WINTHROP, JOURNAL, supra note 149, at 240.
206. Id. at 239-40. Of course, one should be wary of Winthrop's bias in the matter.
Nonetheless, Winthrop initially reported that the court stated that they "were clear in the justice
of their proceedings" and if they did it again would judge the same unless the conference of
churches suggested otherwise. Id. at 217. On Wheelwright, see Sargent Bush, Jr., John
Wheelwright's Forgotten Apology: The Last Word in the Antinomian Controversy, 64 NEW
ENG. Q. 22 (1991); Sargent Bush, Jr., "Revising what we have done amisse': John Cotton and
John Wheelwright, 1640, 45 WM & MARY Q. 733 (3d ser. 1988). References to Greensmith
show a similar lack of concern over the appeal. In August 3, 1637 Winthrop noted that
Greensmith appealed to the king upon being censured but "the court, notwithstanding, commit-
ted him." 1 WINTHROP, JOURNAL, supra note 149, at 228. John Underhill even suggested
sending Greensmith to England "to stop his clamours." Letter from John Underhill to John
Winthrop (Aug. 1637), in 3 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, at 460.
207. Roger Williams, Letter of Mr. John Cotton, Examined and Answered (1644), in 1
PUBLICATIONS OF THE NARRAGANSETT CLUB, supra note 164, at 332 [hereinafter Williams,
Letter of Mr. John Cotton]. Eusden suggests the question was "What authority was to be
obeyed above all others." EUSDEN, supra note 35, at 114-16.
208. Letter from Thomas Harrison to John Winthrop (Apr. 10, 1648), in 5 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, 212, at 212-13.
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ity. But the culture of appeal with its blurred boundaries between the lit-
erary, the legal, and the political meant that the appeal could also be used
actually to accept or reject political authority-without dangerous con-
frontations.
Within New England in the 1640s, Thomas Lechford was among the
first to take advantage of this culture of appeal by using the appeal to rep-
resent his acceptance and Massachusetts Bay's defiance of English
authority. Lechford's discussions of appeal in Plain Dealing appear in
amendments he apparently made to his manuscript in late 1641 after
leaving the colonies. 09 The impetus for the amendments is not clear, al-
though their substance and tone suggest that they were Lechford's re-
sponse to the Body of Liberties."° Lechford's intent is more clear. He
noted that, although there was "no appeal" from the General Court in
Massachusetts to England, he "presume[d] their Patent doth reserve and
provide for Appeals, in some cases, to the King's Majesty." 2ll The
words "Patent" and "Majesty" underscored that the proper location of
authority was the king, not the colony, and, in essence, accused Massa-
chusetts of defiance. Yet Lechford also used the device of the appeal to
emphasize that, unlike Massachusetts, he accepted such supremacy. He
"appeale[d] to his royal Majesty, and his honorable and great Counsel"
as to the truth of some of his comments. 212 Safely in England, Lechford
was not worried about defying Massachusetts authority.
But in a situation where one was actually defying a very present
authority, the appeal could establish defiance without leaving one dead,
as the story of Rhode Island religious dissident Samuel Gorton demon-
strates. 1 3 In the minds of Massachusetts' authorities, Samuel Gorton was
an old troublemaker. Banished to Rhode Island in 1639 for heretical lay
preaching, Gorton once again became the subject of complaints in 1641
and 1642.214 In 1643, Massachusetts sent an armed force into Warwick
to capture him and a number of others.21 5 In Gorton's mind, the Massa-
chusetts leaders presumed too much authority; therefore, he made an
209. LECHFORD, supra note 187, at xxxviii-xl.
210. See supra note 160 (discussing the Body of Liberties).
211. LECHFORD, supra note 187, at 64.
212. Id. at 67.
213. On Gorton, see PHILIP F. GURA, A GLIMPSE OF SION'S GLORY: PURITAN
RADICALISM IN NEW ENGLAND, 1620-1660 at 194-95, 276-303 (1984); LEWIS G. JANES,
SAMUELL GORTON (1896).
214. GuRA, supra note 213, at 280-81.
215. Id. at 282.
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"appeal to the honourable State of England.,, 216 Another letter, in de-
scribing the incident, emphasizes Gorton's appeal as defiance without
bloodshed: "the resolution on both sides being so hot, that we thought
immediately the Battle would have began; they did then appeal to the
highest Court in old England, for the trial of their right."
217
Even after Massachusetts took Gorton by force, Gorton continued to
express his defiance by declaring that he appealed to England. His ap-
peal was a literary one. He had yet to be tried; the point of his "appeal"
was to demonstrate that he saw England as possessing superior authority
over Massachusetts. Massachusetts was well aware of the meaning of his
appeals and refused to acknowledge them. Like Lechford, Gorton tried
to point out that Massachusetts' mere denial of his appeal signaled a
graver denial of English authority. Massachusetts could try him only "by
virtue" of the judicial power given them from the "State of old Eng-
land." 218 Massachusetts' denial of his appeal thus "must either presup-
pose a superiority in them that deny it, or an equality at the least, with the
State appealed unto."219 Freed eventually by the General Court, Gorton
sailed for England to complain. In England, his publication of Simplici-
tie's Defence (1646), with its endless recounting of his appeals, allowed
Gorton to continue to express his defiance of Massachusetts' erroneous
belief in its supremacy.
The linkage between the appeal and supreme authority haunted even
those who would have preferred to disregard the culture of appeal for
reasons of practical politics. Roger Williams and John Winthrop-two of
the greatest political leaders and intellectuals of the seventeenth century
American colonies-confronted the same political struggle over authority.
For Williams, Rhode Island's famous religious dissenter, the problem lay
in Massachusetts Bay's prosecutions and threats of prosecutions of relig-
ious dissenters who disagreed with the religious and political authority of
the colony. For Winthrop, the leader of Massachusetts Bay, the problem
lay in these dissenters' perpetual attempts to complain to England that the
prosecutions proved that Massachusetts had usurped English authority.
The practical solution for both men was simple: Williams needed to jus-
tify appeals in cases of religious dissent; Winthrop needed to deny ap-
216. SAMUEL GORTON, SIMPLICITIE'S DEFENCE AGAINST SEVEN-HEADED POLICY 40
(1646). The pamphlet also appears in 2 COLLECTIONS OF THE RHODE ISLAND HISTORICAL
SOCIETY (1835).
217. GORTON, supra note 216, at 42.
218. Id. at 55.
219. Id.
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peals without angering England. Yet the culture of appeal was suffi-
ciently strong that neither man felt able to advance the solution without
attempting to rationalize the appeal and supreme authority.
(1) Roger Williams and the Appeal
Roger Williams wanted to reconcile the practical reality of dissent-
ers' need to appeal to England with his theory of the separation of civil
and spiritual authority. Williams believed that the civil realm of govern-
ment did not have authority over the spiritual or religious realm.' Yet
Williams understood that the appeal designated supreme authority. He
wrote, "For in appealing to an higher Judge, a man always presupposeth
(if not skill perfect, yet) competent skill, and a true power committed
from God, to judge in such cases." 1 Thus if appealing signaled the ac-
ceptance of authority, how could the dissenters complain about Massa-
chusetts' treatment of them? Would not appealing prove that they ac-
cepted the civil government's authority over spiritual matters? Williams
was clear that, in spiritual matters, if civil authorities lacked the power to
prosecute, then they also lacked the power to hear appeals for wrongful
prosecution. Williams acknowledged "that stumbling block which many
fall at, to wit, Paul's appealing to Caesar. " '2 He noted that if Paul had
appealed to Caesar in spiritual things, he had committed five evils.' In-
deed, when Williams described his own actions after his banishment, he
emphasized he had appealed, but not to civil authorities: "I humbly ap-
peale[d] unto the Father of Spirits for witness of the upright and constant
diligent search my spirit made after him.'"2 However, the ever politi-
cally adept Williams realized that appealing to God would not stop Mas-
sachusetts' threats.
220. This is a simplification of Williams' theory. On Williams, see PERRY MILLER,
ROGER WILLIAMS: HIS CONTRIBUTION TO THE AMERICAN TRADITION (1962); EDMUND
MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE (1967); SAMUEL HUGH
BROCKUNIER, THE IRREPRESSIBLE DEMOCRAT: ROGER WILLIAMS (1940); W. CLARK GILPIN,
THE MILLENARIAN PIETY OF ROGER WILLIAMS (1979); EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, LIBERTY OF
CONSCIENCE: ROGER WILLIAMS IN AMERICA (1991); ORA ELIZABETH WINSLOW, MASTER
ROGER WILLIAMS (1957).
221. Williams, More Bloody, supra note 177, at 161.
222. Williams, Bloudy Tenent, supra note 164, at 120.
223. Id. at 157-59. Paul's appeal was well known. For example, Wheelwright's appeal
echoed almost precisely Paul's words. See 1 RICHMAN, supra note 137, at 46-47.
224. Williams, Letter of Mr. John Cotton, supra note 207, at 56; 1 CORRESPONDENCE OF
ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note 136, at 22.
July 1997]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Williams' desire to justify appeals and his dislike of Massachusetts'
assertion of its authority led him to redefine the type of persecution expe-
rienced by dissenters and the proper location of authority in the civil
state.' In The Bloudy Tenent (1644) and The Bloody Tenent Yet More
Bloody (1647), Williams argued that Paul had not appealed in spiritual
matters: "And yet Caesar (as a civil supreme Magistrate) ought to defend
Paul from civil violence, and slanderous accusations about sedition, mu-
tiny, civil disobedience, &c. And in that sense who doubts but that
God's people may appeal to the Roman Caesar."226
Williams later emphasized, "Paul never appealed to Caesar as a
Judge appointed by Christ Jesus to give definitive sentence in any spiri-
tual or Church controversy, but against that civil violence and murder
... Paul justly appealed."' 7 Given that the church-state structure of
Massachusetts resulted in spiritual disagreements being linked to sedition
and civil disobedience, Williams' theory, in essence, condoned appeals in
all cases. Indeed, by 1647, Williams explicitly stated that "persecution
for matters of conscience" was not a spiritual matter but "a violence
against the civil state" from which the "supreme officer" was "bound to
protect the bodies, goods, or good names of his subjects."' By rede-
fining the underlying matter, Williams could have his appeals and his
theory of separate authority.
Yet this discussion of the appeal also provided Williams with an op-
portunity to redefine the location of civil authority. Williams suggested
that, although God reigned supreme in the spiritual realm, the English
king might not be the supreme power in the civil realm. Williams stated
that in certain cases "the last Appeal must come to the Bar of the People
or Commonweal, where all may personally meet, as in some Common-
225. Williams, More Bloody, supra note 177, at 226-28. Williams used Gorton as an exam-
ple. On Clarke, see The Copie of a Letter of R. Williams of Providence in New England to
Major Endicott, Governor of the Massachusetts, in Williams, More Bloody, supra note 177, at
502. On the antinomian controversy and dissent in the 1640s, see THE ANTINOMIAN
CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY ix-23 (David D. Hall, ed., 2d. ed.
1990); 1 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THREE EPISODES OF MASSACHUSETTS HISTORY 363-532
(Russell & Russell; rev. ed. 1965) (1892); GuRA, supra note 213; ANDREW DELBANCO, THE
PURITAN ORDEAL 118-48 (1989); JANICE KNIGHT, ORTHODOXIES IN MASSACHUSETTS:
REREADING AMERICAN PURITANISM 13-33 (1994). Glenn LaFantasie's editorial notes to The
Correspondence are particularly useful. See 1 CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra
note 136.
226. Williams, Bloudy Tenent, supra note 164, at 159.
227. Id. at 243.
228. Williams, More Bloody, supra note 177, at 161. Williams also discussed Paul's ap-
peal. See id. at 273-75.
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weals of small number, or in greater by their Representatives."2 9 The
people, Williams implied, were the supreme authority. Williams' almost
culturally relativist list of authorities to whom one could appeal-"the
Roman Caesar, an Egyptian Pharaoh, a Philistian Abimelecke, an Assy-
rian Nabuchadnezzar, the great Mogol, Prester John, the great Turk, or
an Indian Sachim"-suggests that Williams saw both Caesar and the king
as drawing their authority from the Commonweal. 30 Like Lilburne, 23
Williams used the appeal to construct a theory of authority which rested
with the people.
With his understanding of authority redefined, Williams supported
the appeal. When he returned from England, he was moderator for the
1647 Providence town session that instructed the Assembly to create ap-
peals in Rhode Island.23' In 1666, he praised the "inestimable Jewels" in
the new 1663 Rhode Island charter which explicitly permitted appeals to
England in cases of public controversy between colonies.3 Indeed, in
1670 Williams made apparent that all of these understandings were linked
to the appeal. He described Rhode Island's decision to seek redress by
the charter's appeal provision in a boundary dispute as "the Case of Paul
appealing to Caesar. "14
(2) John Winthrop and the Appeal
Unlike Williams, who wanted to justify appeals, John Winthrop
needed to legitimize Massachusetts' denial of dissenters' complaints and
appeals to England without appearing to imply the colony was separating
and rejecting England's supreme authority. The stumbling block for
Winthrop was that the colony was a corporation, that it had been dele-
gated authority from the crown, and that there was therefore an implicit
right to appeal implied in the charter. Winthrop knew this argument well
in the form of what he referred to as Dr. Robert Child's "logic": "every
corporation of England is subject to the laws of England" and "this was a
corporation of England, ergo."23' Winthrop could do little to argue that
the colony was not a corporation, although he suggested that "though
229. Williams, Bloudy Tenent, supra note 164, at 356. Williams added that this appeal
could not occur because it suggested that all power came from the people instead of God. Id.
230. Id. at 159; see also id. at 174 (referring to appeals to magistrates and governors).
231. See discussion in text accompanying supra note 208.
232. 1 CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER WILLIAMS, supra note 136, at 233 nn.13-14.
233. 2 id. at 535.
234. Id. at 618 (documenting a letter dated June 22, 1670).
235. 2 WINTHROP, JOURNAL, supra note 149, at 304.
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plantations be bodies corporate... yet they are also above the rank of an
ordinary corporation. "236 But even if such hierarchy of corporations had
existed, it did little to alter the historic precedents that suggested crown
patents had delegated specific judicial powers and did not need to explic-
itly reserve the right of appeals.237
In attempting to justify denying appeals without renouncing English
authority, Winthrop tried to reinterpret the appeal as a common-law
creation. First, he tried to turn the corporate patent from the king into a
common-law document. If the patent was a common-law document, he
could claim that any reservation as to a right to appeal had to be stated in
the patent. Winthrop advanced this reservation argument in a number of
different settings. He suggested this textualist understanding of the patent
in numerous discussions with the deputies.23 Winthrop's journal entry
on Wheelwright's appeal likewise argued that the patent denied ap-
peals.239 And in his 1644 recounting of the Wheelwright appeal, A Short
Story, Winthrop emphasized:
Upon this he appealed to the Kings Majesty, but the Court told him an
appeal did not lie in this case, for the King having given us an authority
by his grant under his great seal of England to hear and determine all
causes without any reservation, we were not to admit of any such ap-
peals for any such subordinate state, either in Ireland, or Scotland, or
other places; and if an appeal should lie in one case, it might be chal-
lenged in all, and then there would be no use of government among us
240
But by the 1644 publication, Winthrop seemed to grow uncertain
about the patent reservation argument. In his earlier journal account of
236. Id.
237. Id. at 304-5. Winthrop could not abandon the patent because it permitted the magis-
trates "to execute Justice." Cotton, Reply, supra note 176, at 45. On Winthrop, see JAMES G.
MOSELEY, JOHN WINTHROP'S WORLD (1992); LEE SCHWENINGER, JOHN WINTHROP (1990).
Winthrop wrote to his son in 1646 that the Child petitioners "did presently appeal to the
Parl[ia]ment, etc: so as we are like to proceed to some Censure for their appeal, if not for the
Petition." Letter from John Winthrop to John Winthrop, Jr. (Nov. 16, 1646), in 5 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, 119, at 120. The appeal appears to have been interlocutory. Child re-
ferred to his "Appeal before Parliament" and hoped that his "Cause may be heard before indif-
ferent Arbiters." Letter from Robert Child to John Winthrop, Jr. (May 14, 1647), in 5
WINTHROP PAPERS, supra, at 160.
238. On the patent and corporations during the negative vote debate, see 4 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, at 382.
239. 1 WINTHROP, JOURNAL, supra note 149, at 240.
240. Winthrop, A Short Story, in THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, supra note 174, at
256-57 [hereinafter Winthrop, A Short Story].
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the Wheelwright appeal, he had simply added an ambiguous "etc." to his
argument about the patent.24 In A Short Story, Winthrop explicitly ex-
panded the "etc.":
[N]either did an appeal lie from any Court in an County or Corporation
in England, but if a party will remove his cause to any of the King's
higher Courts, he must bring the King's Writ for it; neither did he ten-
der any appeal, nor call any witnesses, nor desired any Act to be en-
tered of it.
242
Parallel to this common-law reservation argument, Winthrop also
advanced a common-law understanding of redress. If one wanted to re-
move a case, one had to bring a writ of error, not an appeal. If one had
failed to follow the proper procedures, then the appeal must never have
existed. Winthrop seemed to hope that he could define away the ap-
peals.243
All these technical common-law arguments, however, could not
convincingly disguise the fact that when Massachusetts refused to permit
appeals, it denied England's supreme authority. Winthrop's efforts did
not stop the English commissioners for foreign plantations from investi-
gating the Gorton situation nor from showing interest in another group of
dissenters who wrote the Child Remonstrance. 244 The culture of appeal
was too strong to be distinguished or reinterpreted away.
Finally, in a 1646 petition to the English commissioners, Winthrop
abandoned the common-law arguments. Accepting the culture of appeal,
he confronted the issue of authority. He explicitly stated that the colony
recognized the supremacy of England. In an eerie historical twist, Win-
throp referred to the Henrician Act of Appeals. Winthrop's petition
stated that "the records" showed the wisdom of "our ancestors" who
"acknowledged a supremacy in the bishops of Rome in all causes ecclesi-
astical, yet would not allow appeals to Rome."24 Borrowing language
from the preface to the Henrician Act, the petition stated that appeals
"would be destructive of all government" because the colony would have
241. 1 WINTHROP, JOURNAL, supra note 149, at 241.
242. Winthrop, A Short Story, supra note 240, at 256-57.
243. Id. at 257.
244. The fear of the Gorton and Child appeals twice sent Edward Winslow to England. His
effort to stop Gorton's Hypocrisie Unmasked, did not address the appeals issue. EDWARD
WINsLOw, HYPOCRISIE UNMASKED, A TRUE RELATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
GOVERNOR AND COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS AGAINST SAMUEL GORTON OF RHODE
ISLAND (The Club for Colonial Reprints 1916) (1646).
245. 2 WINTHROP, JOURNAL, supra note 149, at 312.
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to follow the "delinquents" to England "where the evidence and circum-
stances of facts cannot be so clearly held forth as in their proper place"
and the expenses would be great.246 If the Puritan leaders of Massachu-
setts were Henry VIII, then England could only be Rome. Winthrop
must not have thought much of the commissioners. The analogy betrayed
the precariousness of the argument-when Henry VIII had barred ap-
peals, he had ended the supremacy of Rome.
However, Massachusetts had acknowledged English authority and
the commissioners returned the favor by writing a response which
seemed to support Massachusetts' practice. In 1647, the commissioners
responded, "[W]e intended not.., to encourage any appeals from your
justice."247 The commissioners added that they did not intend to "restrain
the bounds of your jurisdiction to a narrower compass than is held forth
by your letters patent" and that they would "leave you with all that free-
dom and latitude that may in any respect, be duly claimed by you."248
Both comments left open whether the patent implicitly reserved appeals.
Nonetheless, Massachusetts took the response as a sign that the denial of
appeals was compatible with English supremacy. Into the 1660s, the col-
ony would proclaim its ability to deny appeals to England even as it clung
tight to the culture of appeal. 249
In places as diverse as Rhode Island and Massachusetts, the appeal
survived with the help of people as ideologically different from one an-
other as Williams and Winthrop. As numerous other incidents during the
1640s in Massachusetts and Rhode Island demonstrate, the appeal signi-
fied the acceptance of authority to such a degree that discussions of the
appeal provided a space to construct and recognize authority. American
Indians such as Pumhom used the appeal to indicate which colony's
authority they would temporarily recognize.' 0 John Winthrop and the
246. Id.
247. Id. at 337.
248. Id. Hugh Peter mysteriously wrote Winthrop shortly before the answer of the com-
missioners that "[a]ppeals will hardly be overthrown" and that they should not be troubled by
such appeals. Letter from Hugh Peter to John Winthrop (May 5, 1647), in 5 WINTHROP
PAPERS, supra note 8, 157 at 159.
249. A 1661 General Court order stated that the governor and other officials in Massachu-
setts had "full power and authority" over "ecclesiastics and civils, without appeal." 4
MASSACHUSETTS RECORDS, supra note 150, at 24-25 (documenting an Act of the General
Court dated June 10, 1661).
250. Letter from William Arnold to the Governor or Deputy Governor of Massachusetts
(Aug. 15, 1648), in 5 WINTHROP PAPERS, supra note 8, at 246. The entire passage is worth
quoting:
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Massachusetts deputies discussed the appeal as they struggled to agree
upon the precise composition of the supreme authority of the General
Court. 5 ' Robert Child and the Remonstrants used the appeal to suggest
that supreme authority should be relocated in the fundamental laws of
England instead of "arbitrary government." 2  And the Rhode Island
towns adopted the appeal in the General Court of Trials as a way of sig-
naling their belief that "the Sovereign power of all Civil Authority is
founded in the consent of the People.""
The appeal did not fade as the original corporate structure of the
colonies disappeared because it carried with it a larger vision of law's
relationship to the world. The colonists adopted a word that they used in
everyday life to structure their relationships with each other and with
God. They accepted a word that envisioned a justice of equity, of re-
hearings on the merits, and of individual redress. They came to embrace
a word that reconfirmed the structure of authority each time it was used.
And perhaps most importantly, they accepted the appeal because each
grievance became a new bargain: the acknowledgment of authority for
Then came Pumhom and many of his men to rescue the Indians and so there came forth
many of the English also and so Randall Holden warned Pumhom to the Court which is
to be holden as he said at Plymouth 30 days hence, but Pumhorn said no he would ap-
peal, only to have his Case tried by the Court of Massachusetts. So Punhom he is
afraid how his Cause will be heard if he should be compelled to go to Plymouth be-
cause he knows that these Interpreters here abouts be all on the Gortonists Part against
him and he said that Mr. Brown is one of the Commissioners to try his Cause the which
Pomhom do except against for these reasons, first because he knows Mr. Brown to fa-
vor the company of the Gortonists and do often frequent them and also that Company
goes over often to him, and be very familiar with him. Id. at 246-47.
251. John Winthrop's Discourse on Arbitrary Government (1644), in 4 WINTHROP PAPERS,
supra note 8, at 468. See id. at 477 ("is there not a clear way of help in such cases, by Appeal,
or Petition to the highest Authority?").
252. See THOMAs HUTCHINSON, THE HUTCHINSON PAPERS 214, at 216 (Burt Franklin
1967) (1865). The Remonstrants suggested these measures were a "good means to prevent di-
vers unnecessary Appeals into England." Id. at 218. In 1646, William Vassall and Robert
Child petitioned the General Court to establish the fundamental laws of England and extend the
franchise beyond male church members. When asked to retract the Remonstrance, several of
the signers appealed to England. Massachusetts decided to prosecute, in part, for appealing
before any sentence was given. The petitioners were sentenced and fined. They were freed,
although with fines outstanding. Child's brother sailed for England to complain in a pamphlet,
NEW ENGLANDS JONAS CAST UP AT LONDON (1647), reprinted in 4 COLLECTIONS OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 110 110-20 (2d ser. 1846). On Child, see GuRA, su-
pra note 213, at 196-204; George Lyman Kittredge, Dr. Robert Child the Remonstrant, in 21
PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS, TRANSACTIONS 1-146 (1919).
253. Williams, Bloudy Tenent, supra note 164, at 214; see also id. at 249, 355, 367. Each
town had a representative on the General Court of Trials, as well as the town judges from
whichever town the Court sat in.
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the guarantee of equity. In the end, they adopted a word whose ancient
heritage may have reminded them that, rather than remaining salaman-
ders far from England, they could aspire to the culture of the sons of
God.
Conclusion
In the decades after Williams and Winthrop had come to accept this
new culture of appeal, the "salamander" William Harris continued to
practice it by appealing to England to gain possession of land claims in
Pawtuxet. In December 1679, he set sail for England to appeal for exe-
cution of his judgments. In route, Barbary pirates captured the ship and
Harris was imprisoned in Algiers. Surviving on bread and water, Harris
awaited payment of his ransom." He wrote to his family that if "the
sum fail or the time it is most like to be my death." 5 By August 1680,
Harris had begun to give up hope of the ransom being paid. He wrote,
"I am content to die here if God so please; I am not afraid of death.""
His lawsuit, however, was never far from his mind and he noted that "for
my unsettled affairs I commit them to God." 7 In the summer of 1681,
Harris' ransom was paid and he traveled to England with the intent to
complete his appeal. Tragically, the long period of capture had been too
much for his sixty-one-year-old body. He died three days after reaching
London. 8
In exploring the culture of appeal that surrounded Harris and the
other English colonists, I have been conscious of Stanley Katz's caution
that the search for the "sources" of "cultural patterning" is "essentially a
diversionary approach."259 I have used the sources of the appeal, not so
much to prove "the original pattern," but to restore to the colonists their
rich cultural understanding of the appeal and to wrench us away from our
technical "rule of law" assumptions about the appeal. Caught up in the
heady rise of the administrative state, Goebel and Pound thought the only
254. This account is detailed in Harris Papers, supra note 4, at 21, 324.
255. Id. at 321.
256. Id. at 330.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 341. Despite Harris' death, the other proprietors did not give up easily. They
continued to appeal and complain throughout the remaining decades of the seventeenth century.
Finally, in 1705, their agent wrote that he had been told by his lawyer "the great length of time
that this case has been depending (about 47 years) will be a stumbling block in your way never
to be got over." Id. at 21. The land claims were submitted to arbitration and settled.
259. Katz, supra note 24, at 476-77.
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lesson to be learned from the history of the appeal involved the "efforts
to establish a rule of law."m Goebel believed that the belief in rule of
law had always been part of American legal development. He wrote of
the founding moments, "there is no denying the suzerainty of the great
fundamentals-the supremacy of the law, the prescription of certainty,
the orderly determination of controversies and, above all, the dominating
concept of due process."' Pound, on the other hand, found these ideas
often sadly lacking. He noted that after legal institutions "have been set
up to divergent patterns or have grown up to no pattern, there comes a
time when unsystematic confusion brings about friction and waste and
men set about to bring institutions into the order of reason."'262 Nonethe-
less, both men had faith that proper procedures and the rule of law were
the only substantive theory of justice required.
But the culture of appeal was far more complicated than Goebel and
Pound could imagine with their obsession with the rule of law. In this
Article, I have shown that the culture of appeal was not the product of
"primitive notions," a "lack of legal expertise,"m or "little close ac-
quaintance with the arcane technicalities of the common law."' Instead,
the culture of appeal was the result of sophisticated understandings of an
English and Western European tradition of civil and ecclesiastical law.'-
The system that the colonists adopted and adapted contained a substantive
theory of justice that differed from the rule of law. Their belief in the
importance of equity from an accepted hierarchical political authority led
them to create a new culture of appeal. The new culture ironically was
based on a procedural device that was linked to institutions they despised
(Rome, the Pope, ecclesiastical courts, the king), but with a set of mean-
ings that held forth a promise of justice nonexistent in England.
The historian Stephen Foster reminds us: "Now, there is no point in
demanding of the past that it be logical. It has not been so. Accordingly,
the study of the past needs to be endowed with a certain healthy illogical-
ity, a willingness not to think too straightly about crooked and confused
260. 1 GOEBEL, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 3, at 2.
261. Id.
262. POUND, ORGANIZATION, supra note 13, at 3-4.
263. Katz, supra note 24, at 476.
264. Warden, supra note 169, at 144.
265. Lloyd Bonfield has recently suggested that some ecclesiastical court law may have ac-
tually been transmitted to the colonies. Lloyd Bonfield, Canon Law in Colonial America: Some
Evidence of the Transmission of English Ecclesiastical Court Law and Practice to the American
Colonies, in CANON LAW IN PROTESTANT LANDS 253-71 (Richard H. Helmholz ed., 1992).
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paths."5 Institutional legal history abounds with crooked and confused
paths forced unnaturally straight by previous generations of scholars
whose vested interest in preserving the rule of law extended to rewriting
the past. Accepting an illogicality about institutional development, we
might follow a few paths to their cultural complexity. We might look to
the past, not for a preordained path, but for the dream of what legal in-
stitutions could become. The culture of appeal embedded into our na-
tional consciousness a deep belief in the importance of equity and a
longing to recognize only those authorities who would promise equity. It
left us, not with an answer, but with only a word-the appeal-to recall
to us the search for justice.
266. Stephen Foster, Not What But How-Thomas Minor and the Ligatures of Puritanism,
in PURITANISM: TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES ON A SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ANGLO-
AMERICAN FAITH 35 (Francis J. Bremer ed., 1993).
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